This article interweaves recurring themes of critical thinking, virtue ethics, civil functionality, judicial pragmatism, classical education, and the necessity of judgment-based nuance. The reconciliation of idealistic virtue with realistic governance, tethered always to disciplined judgment. Zegarelli does not absolve liars. He demands their judgment be near-divine. And he does not praise falsehood, only recognizes that truth is not always an immediate virtue, because virtue is judged by outcome, habit, and courage, not superficial compliance with binary codes. In that, Zegarelli’s realism aligns with Bacon, Machiavelli, Jesus (as cited), and Socrates—making this article not a detour, but a core waypoint in his master map of the examined life. [AI Assessment]
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Preface:
Let us not be schoolchildren who cower from the parson’s whip. It stings, of course, but the standing truth is that people lie. Everyone, except you and me, of course, which goes without saying.
True. If we were in the parson’s church, we might play it differently. We might pray, and hope, and believe, and have faith, and trust, and, well, keep waiting for god’s (or the gods’) metaphysical benefactions. And, indeed, our desires, and wishes, and would-be’s, and could-be’s, and should-be’s, are great for church.
But, alas, such as it is, the this-life and the after-life are not fully aligned, and they never have been, at least so far as we can assess it, rationally and by experience. I’ve been at church and I’ve taught at church. If we were in church, I would play it one way, but we’re not in church. As to the secular here and now, the lion and lamb do not lie together, but in truth, one preys and one is prey.
The truth—dare I say it—is that lying is part of the facts of real-world social life. Even certain well-laid social pragmaticisms of courtesy and gesture rest upon lying. And no one is more pragmatic than Mother Nature. [1]
For the literary scholars in the room, Charles Dickens’ Mr. Bumble [1a] may continue to quip—“squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands”—that the perfect truth-teller must be a bachelor, because experience proves that it would be idiocyand asinine to suggest that any married man escapes the rare white lie about his wife’s food, clothing, weight, hairdo, or something else… Except for you reader-husbands and me, of course, which goes without saying.
For the political scientists in the room, we can review Honest Abe’s artful dodging and clever machinations to achieve all the good of the 13th Amendment, using his wily feigns and crafty scrivener ambiguations. [1b]
For the warriors in the room, we can refer to The Art of War that asserts that all war is based upon forms of deception, and perhaps similarly for business, sports, and advertising, among other real life-contexts. “Ludus est simulare.” (“Game is feign.”)
And, yes, sure, for some bachelor priests, who may also be philosophers—and particularly Kantians and those who hold that the so-called Christian Virtues are actually virtues (albeit other assertions they are not) [2]—will say even to their own martyred self-destruction that all lying is morally wrong, self-flagellating as necessary. Yes, this position makes for great academics and church sermons, but lousy pragmatics. Wisdom is a practical art. [3]
“Sapientia non est ulli ecclesiae, nec servo morali.” (“Wisdom is not a slave to any church or morality.”) and “Prudentia bonum iudicat. Bonus non iudicat quid sit sapiens.” (“Wisdom judges what is good. Good does not judge what is wise.”)
If it’s doing its job, the Cardinal Virtue of Wisdom thinks freely entirely for itself, and it never ever defeats itself, unlike hope, and love, and belief, and faith, and trust and other “noble emotions” that defeat themselves…all the time. [*2]
Crazy, hopeful, foolish, stupid, love. [4]
Indeed, Wisdom’s nemesis, Foolishness, is oft brightly clothed in hope, and love, and belief, and faith, and trust. [*2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, *4, 24, 24a]
Schools today are now often afraid to teach traditional critical-thinking principles, because it is too dangerous—exposing us to behold ugly truths—particularly with the advent of the clinical psychology industry. Moreover, it might come back to whip the teacher, whose only defense might be the truth about lying. [23]
“What? Are you suggesting that a lie might be good? The absurdity of it! The paradox of it! How can bad be good?” [13]
Indeed, lies and war. Not necessarily good, as such, but necessary for good, as such. It depends.
Time and context, intention and purpose. It is too complex for some, particularly those who have not been seasoned for the judgment of it—who cannot withstand the ugly sight of it—oft by a lack of preparation by depth of proper education. [14, 15, *23] So be it. We do our job. [16]
That said, certainly, a little child might not yet have the deftness of judgment to understand the art of the lie, but the art of the lie must be introduced as part of necessary human “it depends” critical-thinking judgment-training at some point, as an overt truth of life. Wisely to know it, does not mean to do it.
The parson—tending all dove and no serpent—replicates repressions and conflations, relying upon god’s (or the gods’) benefactions, and thereby makes us all dysfunctional, preventing the secure harmonious self-reconciliation that is adduced from proper “it-depends” judgment-training, and thereby sends us all lock-step self-flagellating by penalty, crying and confessing to therapists.
As an attorney—being trained in lying—it seems right for me to preach not what should be, but, rather, was actually is and will be, as a true fact of life. We can leave the morally righteous sermons for church. Behold, Socrates said that the ancient priests seem to know the wisdom of god (or the gods) better than he did anyway, and so much more for the mere me. [17, 18]
Perhaps less noble in the fleeting moment, but some lies find a place of nobility in the course of time. [19] The oft misunderstood sage sees context within a different space of time, knowing time gets its day. [*18, 20]
Mark it: Both lies and the truth are Wisdom’s tools, [*20] as “serpent and dove,” said Jesus. [21]The judgment of the sage chooses the serpent or the dove, or the lie or the truth, and when, if ever, anything in between. It just depends.
‘Black and white’ so easy to say, but judgment rests in shades of the gray.
[22] But to get ahead of it, we will see that Sir Francis will suggest that not everyone is wise or strong enough to manage it, and therein lies the issue.
So now, let us review one master’s exposition on lying, being one of the most traditionally celebrated essays of all time.
Introduction to the Text:
From many great chapters in Sir Francis Bacon’s Essays, I chose principally Chapter 6. The reason is because the subject of lying, as part of social interaction, is persistent, and horizontal, and pervasive.
Moreover, I found this essay far less approachable than some of Bacon’s other essays, so I thought it might be a particularly good chapter to restate and try to make more approachable for the common ear of today. The following is an abridgment and translated for certain words or concepts. Such edits are inexact and interpretive, and, commentary notwithstanding, I have endeavored not to touch the original text any more than I considered to be appropriate.
I confess that it took me many readings and much thought for this short essay, because Bacon uses several different terms that only make sense together after the reader understands his vernacular, and which are perhaps more artful than our technical study would prefer. To be candid, I found interpreting the language in this short essay to be quite resistant and difficult to approach, except through the path of the Socratic Cardinal Virtues, which operate as a hidden premise for Bacon’s thinking and for his audience, consistent with the relevant formative education of the period. It is not quite as easy or binary as simply addressing lying and telling the truth. Bacon is, after all, philosophizing about lying…
For example, Bacon uses the terms “open” and “closed” in a manner of saying today, “transparent” and “non-transparent,” and then Bacon weaves in the titular terms, “simulation” and “dissimulation.” Thusly, we might generally place Bacon’s subject into the categories of: Truth (Active Transparency), Secrecy (Active Non-Transparency), Dissimulation (Passive Non-Transparency), and Simulation (Falsity). And we must be careful: “dissimulation” and “dissembling” are close but different words, sometimes definitionally conflated; however, dissimulation is only one specific type of dissembling. “Dissembling” is “hiding something,” by misleading or deceiving. All these terms and concepts are weaved in real-time with Bacon’s philosophical exposition, so it took some heavy-lifting to sort it out first, which I have attempted to do here, emphasis added at times.
Although Bacon is not precisely binary with his categorical explanations, it may be of analytical assistance to framework a “dissembler” as someone who is not “forthright”; that is, not actively “fully-transparent,” understanding that forthrightness is a form of the Cardinal Virtue of Courage. [*2] Therefore, there is: A) For Exposing Truth and the Non-Dissembler, a person who is Forthright and courageous (active transparency); and B) For Hiding Truth and the Dissembler, there is a person acting by an increasing degree of culpability: B.1) Secrecy (active non-transparency); B.2) Dissimulation (passive non-transparency); and/or B.3) Simulation (lying, pretending, feigning).
So, the attributes at the two polar ends are Truth(A) and Falsity (B.3). The former is factual truth by Forthrightness (Full Transparency) (implicating courage), and the latter is Lying (aka, “Simulation”), being truth-corrupted falsity (implicating cowardice), which includes “feigns and pretends.”
The “truth” is singular, absolute and stands alone, but the hidings of truth are a matter of degree. Consistent with the resultant A/B categorical framework above, we remember that simulation (lying) indeed hides the truth, but it is not per se a matter of “transparency.“
Lying, unlike secrecy and dissimulation, is not only hiding truth, but it is hiding it by the expressed change to it.
For the middle two categories, the first is “closed” Secrecy (active non-transparency) (B.1), being the withholding of factual truth. Bacon seems to say that, in certain cases, secrecy necessarily inherits its quality of dissembling as a practical matter of keeping the secret itself; that is, it’s not the withholding of the truth per se that causes the dissembling, but in protecting the secret. For example, a priest might receive a secret, without being pressed to dissemble.
The second is “Dissimulation” (passive non-transparency) (B.2), which is the most complex category of all, as such, because:
Dissimulation is not forthright truthfulness, dissimulation is not per se overt lying, and dissimulation is not a secret.
Dissimulation is to “let fall signs and arguments” as a cause to a false effect, perhaps being to mislead without an overt lie.
As you will see below, Bacon’s use of the phrase “lets fall signs” is very difficult, because the grammatical voice of “lets fall” could mean actively placing the factual bait of misunderstanding (without an overt lie) or it could mean passively playing into a false fact without correcting it. Moreover, Bacon places the terms (industriously and expressly) “pretending” and “feigning” into the “simulation” category of overt lying. This might be culturally periodic in connotation.
For example, it is commonly acceptable in today’s “classless” cultural structures to feign (fake) status without overtly lying, but, in Bacon’s culture at the time, the class structure was rigid, and a social “pretender” had a much clearer connotation of overt falsity and culpability, such as a “pretender” to the throne. So, in today’s usage, a “feign” or “pretense” is more likely to be dissimulation, but it is less clear by Bacon, who categorizing feigns and pretenses with overt lies.
Case in point: Let us say that a young lawyer has no disposable income and can barely afford meals, but starves himself and his family to buy a new BMW with the intention and for the purpose of putting on false airs (feigns, pretenses) of success. [The justification for this action, and whether by hubris, vanity or clever business psychology, only follows Bacon’s initial categorization, such as by an affirmative defense.] This action is not forthrightly truth, it is not a secret, and it is not an overt lie. It is the act of baiting error.
It simply pulls the falsity rather than pushes it. Less sure perhaps, but only a different method as cause for the same or similar intended effect. A sign is a signal of direction. Falsely telling someone about wealth and driving a BMW are both expressions, just different types, understanding only the former is a per se corruption of the fact itself.
Remember, a lie is an overt corruption of a fact. A feign achieves a similar result but only by allowing the corruption to occur in the audience by reception rather than by per se transmission.
One interpretation is that the case in point presents no untrue statement (lie), per se, even though the action is intended specifically to “let fall signs” of success to bait false conclusions. [Lawyers might call a non-forthright expression that draws a false inference to be less than the “whole truth,” which begs exactly the question of whether, if at any point, a half-truth becomes a whole lie.]
Since Bacon uses the terms “pretend” and “feign” in the overt lie (B.3, simulation) category, and in light of the overall structure of his essay as established above, one conclusion is that the proffered case scenario, although more subtle (which is exactly why it is the harder case), is that the young lawyer’s conduct is active falsity by simulation, rather than passive non-transparency by dissimulation. This makes sense on the falsity-transparency framework above, because transparency of truth would yield the starving family to tell the whole or real story. But we can slide the facts around to adduce different answers, which is why Bacon’s categorization is rather binary, but his scenarios are not, introducing complexity, again, perhaps periodic.
On the one hand, we understand that the nature of an overt lie (B.3) is, by degree, worse than “letting fall signs” (B.2) as an actual corruption of a fact; however, on the other hand, as a matter of the intention (by effort and expression) to mislead, the false end is the same, irrespective of means.
Therefore, dissimulation, as a matter of personal virtue, may regard the duty of correcting mistruth without playing into it and using it, but, because Bacon speaks of habits in this regard, there appears to be the reference to the subject not merely correcting but also being the creator.
Then again, human virtue for Bacon was tied to a moralistic framework of the periodic culture, so correcting any error of truth would be divinely required, though a less culpable condition, since the correcting would not be necessitated by the creating.
Perhaps it is best simply generally to say that dissembling is deception by dissimulation or simulation. And, dissimulation is to be the cause of or to allow false conclusions, other than by overt corruption to a fact of truth (that is, any form of deception that does not rise to an overt lie). Or to press our consideration even further, perhaps that dissembling is generally to hide or to corrupt the truth, but simulation is to corrupt a material fact upon which truth is based; that is, corrupting the cause versus corrupting the effect itself.
Each reader can judge it. The virtue might be discovered more in the consideration than in the conclusion. [25]
In closing, regarding the “implications” for virtue or vice regarding dissembling, it is important to note, as Sir Francis suggests in different ways, that what is a virtue or vice is not necessarily determined by the “great and rare” exception, but by the habit, as only the latter implicates the holistic character and integrity of a person.
Indeed, for the theists in the room—with Sir Francis joining—dissembling would implicate a direct affront to god (or the gods), and it might be said in this way:
If truth is owned by god (or the gods), then dissembling is to take the property of god (or the gods) and to debase it; thusly, the reason to do so—by honor of intents and purposes—had better be divinely persuasive. The accounting will come later.
I encourage you to review the text, first-hand, in original form, and to study the subject, as Bacon has been actively traditionally studied in generations-past. [*15]
So says Sir Francis Bacon:
Dissimulation [false implications] is but a faint [weak] kind of policy [operation] or wisdom [character], for it asks for a strong wit [cleverness] and a strong heart [moral compass], to know when to tell truth [to be forthright], and then [to have the strength, courage] to do it. Therefore, it is the weaker [lacking] politicians who are the frequent [habitual] dissemblers [who are not forthright].
The attributes of arts [talent, skill] or policy [purpose], and dissimulation and closeness [non-transparency], are indeed of many habits and abilities, and are to be distinguished. [Personal superiority and the ability to be transparent are related attributes, complexly weaved.]
For if a man have the depth of judgment that he can discern what things are to be laid open [and forthrightly transparent], and what is to be kept closed [and non-transparent], and what to be showed at half-lights [deceptions, dissembling], and to whom, and when (which indeed is the art of politics and art of life, as Tacitus properly called them), to him the habit of [frequent] dissimulation is a hindrance [limitation] and poorness [weakness] and disadvantage. [That is, a habit of false implications will limit the superior person, since the superior person has the capability to rise above it and to manage the complexity of it, and thereby the choice, to be artful and selective to social context. Superior capability provides choices, and the power to be bravely transparently forthright.]
But if a man cannot obtain to that judgment, then it is left to him, generally, to be close, secret, and a dissembler [non-transparent, secret, deceiver]. For where a man cannot choose or vary in particulars [that is, being without superior capability to provide choice], there it is good to take the safest and wariest way in general, like the going softly [caution by fear] by one that cannot well see. [That is, the less capable is the person, the less forthright, because the less capable person does not have the choice to manage its effects, being the fallout of professing or exposing the truth.]
Certainly the ablest men that ever were have had all an openness [transparency] and frankness [forthrightness] of dealing, and a name [reputation] of certainty [decisiveness] and veracity [truthfulness]. But then they were like horses well trained [educated, disciplined], for they could tell [discern] when it was necessary to stop or turn: and at such times when they thought the case indeed required dissimulation [false implications, deception] or secrecy [active non-transparency], if then they used it, then it came to pass that the former opinion spread abroad of their good faith and clearness of dealing made them almost invisible. [That is, for the superior person who has developed momentum of reputation for virtuous forthrightness, the exceptional required lack of full transparency does not have enough force materially to shift the person’s reputational inertia. Think Honest Abe.]
There be three degrees of this hiding and veiling of a man’s self.
The first: closeness, reservation and secrecy [active non-transparency] when a man leaves himself without observation or without hold to be taken what he is. [That is, the person is secretive and does not to make expressions at all.]
The second: dissimulation, in the negative, when a man lets fall signs and arguments that he is not that he is. [That is, the person allows factual implications for others falsely to infer an untruth. Causing mistake of truth.]
And the third: simulation, in the affirmative, when a man industriously [purposely with effort] and expressly feigns and pretends to be that he is not. [That is, actively causing untruth and the typical expressive lie.]
For the first of these, secrecy, it is indeed the virtue of a confessor [confidant]. And assuredly the secret man gets to hear many confessions–for who will open himself to a blab or a babbler? [Bacon’s term. Unwise undisciplined talker. The babbler must be a dissembler, because the person providing the information would have been under false pretense to tell a secret to someone who would not keep it.]
But if a man be thought [is exposed] as purposefully secret, then it invites discovery [inquiry] into his own affairs, as air is sucked into a vacuum. [If people think a man is hiding something, then they become actively curious, drawing investigation.]
And as in confession the revealing is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man’s heart, so secret men come to the knowledge of many things in that same way, while men rather discharge their minds than impart their minds. [Persons who can keep secrets learn more things because it is natural for people to “vent” about personal matters.] In few words, mysteries are due to secrecy. [Persons who have discipline to hold their tongues are entitled to secrecy]. Besides (to say truth) nakedness is uncomely, as well in mind as body; and it adds no small reverence to [respect for] men’s manners and actions, if they be not altogether open. [That is, exposure of what should be secret is viewed as discourteous. The truth is too abrupt for most people, so it must be clothed in soft coverings. Some secrecy is a courtesy to others. Some secrecy is not by a contrivance but simply because some things are naturally non-transparent by convention.]
As for talkers and babblers, they are commonly vain [silly, foolish] and credulous [gullible] with everyone. For he that talks what he knows, will also talk about what he does not know. [The mental weakness of discipline that causes loose talk is broader than just facts known, but also facts unknown.] Therefore set it down, that a habit of secrecy is both politic [practical] and moral [courteous]. And in this part it is good that a man’s face give his tongue leave to speak. [That is, it is wise to have the discipline to control not only speech, but also facial expression, and to ensure facial expression does not contradict or give away what would be said. To control “the tell.“]
For the discovery of a man’s self by the tracts [evidence] of his countenance [body language] and [facial] expressions is a great weakness and betraying, by how much it is many times more marked and believed than a man’s words. [Appearance is a better expression than words, for those who can perceive it, because it is more difficult to control. A person should read “body language” and faces but not be read.]
For the second, which is dissimulation, follows many times [magnifies] upon secrecy by a necessity [the implication, passive deception, naturally follows the secret, but although only one degree in rank, it is much more extreme in application]; so that he that will be secret must be a dissembler [deceiver] in some degree [there tends to be some degree of passive deception created in keeping a secret]. For [other] men are too cunning [clever] to suffer [permit] a man to keep an indifferent carriage [impartial countenance] between both [sides of a story], and to be secret, without swaying the balance on either side. [That is, people are known to judge, with natural bias, so a person with a secret tends to have formed an opinion, or a secret position, even if the facts are kept a secret. [25a]]
They will so beset a man with questions, and draw him on, and pick it out of him, that, without an absurd silence, he must show an inclination one way; or if he do not, they will gather as much by his silence as by his speech. [Speaking takes a position, as does not speaking if people know there is a secret. Others will press from so many different ways that they will infer a secret and the hidden preference or judgment. With continued pressing, the confidant will disclose something, and the harder the confidant must manage the inquiries, the more likely that dissimulation will be required.]
As for equivocations, or oraculous [ambiguous] speeches, they cannot hold out long. So that no man can be secret, except he give himself a little scope of dissimulation, which is, as it were, but the skirts or train of [follows] secrecy. [That is, keeping a secret must necessarily accommodate some degree of dissimulation by its nature. Some deception naturally follows keeping the secret, even if the secret is not the facts known, but the fact that there is a secret itself. Some deception with regard to keeping a secret is often must needs be, as there is a truth that is withheld and not made transparent.]
But for the third degree, which is simulation, that I hold more culpable [less morally virtuous], and less politic [socially acceptable], except it be in great and rare matters. [Hard-pressed, necessary. Think 13th Amendment. [1b]] And therefore a general custom [habit] of simulation (which is this last degree) is a vice rising either of a natural falseness [tending as or a born liar] or fearfulness [cowardice], or of a mind that hath some main faults [wrong-thinking], which because a man must needs disguise [relies upon active falsity], it makes him practice simulation in other things, lest his hand should be out of practice. [That is, to make a habit of lying is a flaw of character and integrity, because it exceeds the particular discrete “great and rare” exception. If lying is a habit, then it defines the character and integrity of the person, because a liar in one thing will tend to lie in many things. Distinguish an honest person who finds necessity to lie for the “great and rare” exception, and a liar by character trait. The exceptional lie might be “great and rare” and necessary, but it is never preferred or the default.]
The great advantages of simulation [lying] and dissimulation [deception] are three.
First, to lay asleep opposition, and to surprise. For where a man’s intentions are published, it is an alarum to call up all that are against them. [If others know our real intentions, then it provides them the advantage of allowing preparation.]
The second is, to reserve to a man’s self a fair retreat. For if a man engage himself by a manifest declaration, he must go through or take a fall. [If others believe we will do something, they will know we fail if we do not accomplish it. It is preferred simply to perform than to promise.]
The third is, the better to discover the mind of another. For to him that opens himself men will hardly show themselves adverse, but will (fair) [simply] let him go on, and turn their freedom of speech to freedom of thought. And therefore it is a good shrewd proverb of the Spaniard, “Tell a lie and find a truth,” as if there were no way of discovery but by simulation. [That is, to bait disclosure of enemy information by telling a lie and thereby adduce knowledge, such as by love, trust, hope, fear, belief in the party. The art of the spy.]
There be also three disadvantages, to set it even.
The first, that simulation and dissimulation commonly carry with them a show of fearfulness, which in any business spoils the feathers of the arrow to prevent hitting the mark. [Not being transparent is like running scared causing constraint to clear thinking for the objective. It intrudes noise into the implementation.]
The second, that it puzzles and perplexes the consideration of many who would perhaps otherwise cooperate with him, and makes a man walk almost alone to his own ends. [Not being transparent prevents alliances and bonding, partnering to common goals that must inherently be reliably shared.]
The third and greatest is, that it deprives a man of one of the most principal instruments for action, which is trust and belief. [It prevents the basis of trust.]
[To conclude.] The best composition and temperament is to have openness in reputation for frankness [reputation for forthrightness, full transparency], secrecy in habit [discipline not to express what should not be made known], dissimulation [causing or allowing misdirection, deception] in seasonable use [occasionally], and a power to feign [active lying], if there be no remedy [other option, only in “great and rare” matters].
[End]
Thus is Bacon’s Essay on deception, but, he perhaps reveals his thoughts even more completely with his essay On Truth, in which he closes:
To pass from theological and philosophical truth to the [practical] truth of civil business: it will be acknowledged, even by those that practice it not, that clear and round dealing [forthrightness, fair dealing] is the honor of man’s nature, and that mixture of falsehood is like alloy in coin of gold and silver, which may make the metal work the better [by necessity], but it embaseth [corrupts, de-values] it.
For these winding and crooked courses are the goings of the serpent, which go basely upon the belly [cowardly] and not upon the feet [bravely]. There is no vice that doth so cover a man with shame as to be found false [lying] and perfidious [untrustworthy]; and therefore Montaigne said prettily [elegantly], when he inquired the reason why the word of the lie should be such a disgrace and such an odious charge. Said he:
If it be well weighed, to say that a man lies, is as much as to say that he is brave towards God, and a coward towards man.
For a lie faces God, and shrinks from man. [25a]
[Ed. Note: A liar is arrogant to god, since god knows the lie exists and the liar does it anyway, but a coward to men since the liar is too afraid of men to tell the truth. The worst of both worlds.]
Text abridged from Bacon, Francis. The Essays (Classics). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
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[1] Flattery – No. 54. The Fox and the Crow – The Essential Aesop™- Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_54] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_54]
[1a] Oliver Twist (1948) [David Lean] [MUID225X] “Mr. Bumble: The law is a ass. A idiot.” [Ed. Note: Dickens with his oft subtlety, or not, says that the law must be a bachelor to assume that a wife acts at the direction of her husband, and, if the law actually experienced marriage, the law would know better… Experience teaches what every husband knows…]
[1b] Lincoln [Steven Spielberg ] [MUID104X] – The Vote
[2] Hope, Prayer, Trust and Reliance Upon Luck; Or, the Ignoble Handouts Oft by Noble Emotions [GRZ137] [LinkedIn #GRZ_137]
[3] Epilogue: On the Wisdom of Aesop [GRZ24] [LinkedIn #GRZ_24]
[4] The Folly of Love – No. 85. The Lion in Love – The Essential Aesop™-Back to Basics [GRZ98_85][LinkedIn #GRZ_98_85]
[5] Hiring on Hope – The Business of Aesop™ No. 90 – The Cat-Maiden [GRZ13] [LinkedIn #GRZ_13]
[6] Nature Conforms Action – No. 50. The Scorpion and the Frog – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_50] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_50
[7] Wisdom v. Compassion, Or, the Elizabeth Smart Prediction – No. 60. The Woodsman and Serpent – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_60] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_60]
[8] Think Ahead. The Thing From The Seed. – No. 57. The Swallow and Other Birds – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_57] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_57]
[9] Trusting the People, Trusting the Deal – The Business of Aesop™ No. 13 – The Wolf and the Crane [GRZ53] [LinkedIn #GRZ_53]
[10] Bad Bargains, Power, and Vulnerability By Temptation – No. 13. The Wolf and the Crane – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_13] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_13]
[11] Same for You, Same for Me – The Business of Aesop™ No. 48 – The Two Pots [GRZ54] [LinkedIn #GRZ_54]
[12] Trust, by Tendency and Prediction. No. 36. The Wolf and the Sheep – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_36] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_36]
[13] Critical Thinking and the Conflation of Character, Integrity, Goodness and Virtue [GRZ148] [LinkedIn #GRZ_148]
[14] Good v. Evil; Or, Thoughtlessness by Simplistic Vilification [GRZ126][LinkedIn #GRZ_126]
[15] The History of the Decline and Fall of the American Hegemony—Chapter 4 Excerpt—Education [GRZ182] [LinkedIn #GRZ_182]
[16] Shut Up and Die Like an Aviator. Or, Quit Crying Like a Baby and Do Your Job [GRZ150] [Linked #GRZ_150]
[17] Sorry, Socrates. Or, The “Apology” of Socrates [GRZ60] [LinkedIn #GRZ_60]
[18] The Proseuché (The Prayer of Socrates) Ch. I [What Is Prayer] [GRZ158] [LinkedIn #GRZ_158]
[19] The Lincoln Leadership Dilemma; Or, The Primary Objective [GRZ176] [LinkedIn #GRZ_176]
[20] The Three Noble Cardinal Rules of Wisdom [GRZ189] [LinkedIn #GRZ_189]
[21] The ONE LinkedIn Reference Set Index [GRZ183] [LinkedIn #GRZ_183] ONE: 963 [T10:16] (“Duality“) (963 “Behold, I am sending you like sheep in the midst of wolves; so be shrewd as serpents and simple as doves.”)
[22] Black and White [GRZ249] [LinkedIn]
[23] The Truth. Hard to Handle, Even Harder to Swallow. [GRZ178] [LinkedIn #GRZ_178]
[24] On Empathy: To Give Empathy Is a Blessing; To Need Empathy Is a Curse [GRZ106] [LinkedIn #GRZ_106]
[24a] The Patience of Latent Evil – No. 46. The Wolf and the Shepherd – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_46] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_46]
[25] The Most Valuable Industry – No. 47. The Farmer and His Sons – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_47] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_47]
[25a] Pro-Life or Pro-Choice? [To Be Or Not To Be] Chapter 1, Bias [GRZ91] [LinkedIn #GRZ_91]
[25b] The Price for Deception; Or, What Goes Around. – No. 98. The Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing – The Essential Aesop™ – Back to Basics Abridgment Series [GRZ98_98] [LinkedIn #GRZ_98_98]
“Ludus est simulare.” (“Game is feign.”); “Sapientia non est ulli ecclesiae, nec servo morali.” (“Wisdom is not a slave to any church or morality.”); “Tempus ipsum recipit diem.” (“Time gets its day.”); “Sapientia ars practica est.” (“Wisdom is a practical art.”); “Sapientia scientiam veri quaerit, sed secundum ea quae satis vera sunt agit.” (“Wisdom seeks knowledge of what is true, but it acts upon what is true enough.”); “Prudentia bonum iudicat. Bonus non iudicat quid sit sapiens.” (“Wisdom judges what is good. Good does not judge what is wise.”) ~ grz
“Men in general judge rather by the eye than by the hand, for every one can see but few can touch. Every one sees what you seem, but few know what you are, and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the State to back them up. Moreover, in the actions of all men, and most of all of Princes, where there is no tribunal to which we can appeal, we look to results [the end]. Wherefore if a Prince succeeds in establishing and maintaining his authority, the means will always be judged honourable and be approved by every one [as the means].
“For the vulgar are always taken by appearances and by results, and the world is made up of the vulgar, the few only finding room when the many have no longer ground to stand on.” The Prince [*23]
“98 Write your intentions in cipher. The passions are the gates of the spirit. The most practical sort of knowledge lies in dissimulation. The person who shows his cards risks losing. Let caution and reserve combat the attentiveness of others. When your opponent sees into your reasoning like a lynx, conceal your thoughts like an inky cuttlefish. Let no one discover your inclinations, no one foresee them, either to contradict or to flatter them.” Gracian, Baltasar. The Art of Worldly Wisdom (Mauer).
“Every man wishes to be wise, and they who cannot be wise are almost always cunning.” Samuel Johnson: The Idler
<< Back to Franklin [#GRZ_135] – Forward to Seven Keys [#GRZ_197] >>
Waterloo (Napoleon) [MUID69X] – Feigns [Ed. Note: “Caution and Courage” are two of the four Cardinal Virtues, or Temperance and Fortitude, and when co-existing are harmonized by Justice. “He’s nailed himself” denotes Wellington’s Discipline, and caution for this context implies Wisdom. Wellington is a formidable contender who does not fall trap to the bait. The scene of stoicism with Earl Uxbridge’s leg is both true and has interesting subsequent history.
Lincoln [Steven Spielberg] [MUID103X] – Trust [Ed. Note: Don’t miss the subtlety of time and logistics addressed in the conversation; it goes by quickly. Lincoln had to get the 13th Amendment passed by the states before the Confederate States were rejoined. If the Confederate States rejoined first, before the Amendment, they would have an equal right to defeat the Amendment by their reinstated right to vote. The Confederate States knew this and so tried to get back in fast, seeing the end, but Lincoln did a bit of lawyer trickery to stall the rejoinment of the Confederate States so that the 13th Amendment would be passed by the (Northern) states before the Confederates rejoined. Since the North effectively had already won the War, the Confederates were going to come back in as a fait accompli, but Lincoln masterfully cajoled the timing to end physical slavery. Yes, Honest Abe Lincoln prolonged the Civil War, in effect, to get slavery constitutionally ended first; otherwise, the Civil War would have only resolved the issue of secession and not the issue of slavery. Yes, he was that good.
The Civil War-Burns [MUID62X] – Lincoln – Externalizing self-reflection. [Shelby Foote]
Lincoln [Steven Spielberg ] [MUID104X] – The Vote
Gandhi [MUID214X] – Clever
Abe Lincoln in Illinois [MUID213X] – Lincoln Clever [See also MUID86X]
Star Trek (The Original Series) [MUID283X] – Without duality and balance, there is no ability to choose the serpent or the dove and to apply it as “the good” requires.
ChatGPT Assessment
This article—“Simulation and Dissimulation; Or, The Art of the Lie”—is not a one-off. It is a definitive and integral part of Gregg Zegarelli’s broader philosophical ethos, especially as it interweaves with his recurring themes of critical thinking, virtue ethics, civil functionality, judicial pragmatism, classical education, and the necessity of judgment-based nuance. This piece fits squarely within the architecture of his intellectual project: the reconciliation of idealistic virtue with realistic governance, tethered always to disciplined judgment.
🔍 STRUCTURAL REVIEW: What Is the Article Doing?
This article operates on multiple planes:
- Philosophical: It surveys the Aristotelian-Ciceronian-Baconian virtue tradition, contrasting it with Kantian absolutism.
- Pragmatic: It endorses the use of deception in limited contexts, not as virtue per se, but as a tool of virtue when truth alone cannot serve the good.
- Pedagogical: It functions as a guided interpretive commentary and modern-language translation of Bacon’s Essay VI, teaching the reader both classical moral philosophy and the application of that thought in today’s world.
- Rhetorical: It deploys literary, legal, historical, and theological allusions to reinforce its key distinction—lying may be a vice in general, but deception can, in rare instances, serve a virtuous objective.
🧭 CORE THEMES INTEGRATED INTO ZEGARELLI’S ETHOS
1. Wisdom as Free Agent of Judgment
“Wisdom is not a slave to any church or morality.”
This Zegarelli maxim returns repeatedly across his works, from The Proseuché to Shut Up and Die Like an Aviator. Here, it is the pivot. He explicitly resists the Kantian or religious deontological command to “never lie,” instead positioning Wisdom (the Cardinal Virtue) as that which selects tools—including truth or falsehood—based on time, context, and consequence.
In Zegarelli’s framework, wisdom is not an ideologue. It is a disciplined executor that knows when to use the dove (truth) and when to use the serpent (deception), echoing Jesus’s own dualistic counsel in Matthew 10:16.
2. The Art of Judgment and the “It Depends” Doctrine
“The virtue might be discovered more in the consideration than in the conclusion.”
This underscores one of Zegarelli’s cardinal doctrines: judgment is context-based, not dogma-based. The “art of the lie,” like the use of power, is subject to the virtue of temperance and discernment, not raw preference or emotional impulse.
He has used this same structure in articles like:
- “The Lincoln Leadership Dilemma” — where deception was used in service of the 13th Amendment;
- “The Judicial Oath” — where legal formalism conflicts with theological dogma;
- “The Truth. Hard to Handle, Even Harder to Swallow” — where emotional fragility makes truth nearly impossible in civil society without conditioning.
3. Truth Is a Divine Property—Not Merely a Human Habit
“If truth is owned by God, then dissembling is to take the property of God and debase it.”
This line blends Zegarelli’s moral theology and jurisprudential realism. He often presents God’s ownership of truth as a cosmic fiduciary duty, where humans are custodians. Deception, then, isn’t sin per se, but embezzlement: a use of divine property without adequate cause.
Thus, only great and rare matters may justify lies—invoking Lincoln, war strategy, or protecting the innocent.
4. Virtue in Habit, Not Exception
“What is a virtue or vice is not necessarily determined by the great and rare exception, but by the habit.”
Zegarelli follows Bacon’s—and Aristotle’s—moral psychology here. What matters is not that a person can lie, but whether they habitually do so. This distinction mirrors Zegarelli’s own discussion of character versus integrity:
- Character is about outer reputation.
- Integrity is about inner structure, the habit of decision-making.
So a noble lie in a moment of war is not a vice if the man is habitually truthful. But habitual dissembling—even under the guise of pragmatism—constitutes moral failure.
5. Simulation, Dissimulation, Secrecy, Truth: A Four-Tier Model of Transparency
Zegarelli extrapolates and clarifies Bacon’s structure for modern understanding:
| Category | Definition | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Truth (A) | Full transparency, forthright disclosure | Requires courage |
| Secrecy (B.1) | Withholding truth without false implication | Requires discipline |
| Dissimulation (B.2) | Causing misunderstanding without directly lying | Requires cunning |
| Simulation (B.3) | Overt falsehood (lying, pretending) | Implicates cowardice |
Zegarelli’s use of the young lawyer with the BMW becomes the moral laboratory: an ambiguous modern dilemma that defies binary morality. The point is to train the reader’s judgment, not issue easy answers.
6. Emphasis on Education and Classical Virtue Conditioning
Zegarelli repeatedly critiques modern education for failing to prepare students for the uncomfortable truths of life. This same criticism appears in:
- “The History of the Decline and Fall of the American Hegemony—Chapter 4: Education”
- “Shut Up and Die Like an Aviator”
- “Critical Thinking and the Conflation of Character, Integrity, Goodness, and Virtue”
His solution: return to classical tools like Bacon, Aesop, and Socrates, but in modern translation—with modern grit.
🔚 FINAL ASSESSMENT: Is This Consistent With Zegarelli’s Ethos?
Yes. Absolutely.
This piece is a cornerstone expression of the Zegarelli ethos. It harmonizes with:
- His Socratic method of educating by paradox and contradiction
- His advocacy for “duty over desire”
- His view that wisdom is always situational and grounded in human limitations
- His belief that virtue is pragmatic, not perfectionist
Zegarelli doesn’t argue that lying is good—he argues that knowing when and how to lie may be part of being good, just as a surgeon knows when to cut.
In his moral hierarchy:
- Truth is preferred,
- Secrecy is defensible,
- Dissimulation is risky,
- Simulation (lying) is occasionally necessary—but only if wielded by those disciplined enough to bear the consequences with integrity.
🪞 CONCLUSION: The Reflective Ethic
“A lie faces God and shrinks from man.”
Zegarelli does not absolve liars. He demands their judgment be near-divine. And he does not praise falsehood, only recognizes that truth is not always an immediate virtue, because virtue is judged by outcome, habit, and courage, not superficial compliance with binary codes.
In that, Zegarelli’s realism aligns with Bacon, Machiavelli, Jesus (as cited), and Socrates—making this article not a detour, but a core waypoint in his master map of the examined life.
20250415.4o
Do you have anything to add to this abridgement series article review? A lot of technicals on this one.
Yes. This is one where the 2025 assessment remains directionally right, but I would revise several technical propositions after our more recent work on Wisdom as amoral, Master and Turtle, causation, Wisdom and Luck, and especially the distinction between the thing, its representation, and the judgment applied to it.
I also think your newer prefatory material improves the article because it makes explicit that the object is not to praise lying but to reject a binary analytical model incapable of describing actual human conduct.
There is, however, one place where I think your technical framework can be made cleaner.
1. Bacon’s real continuum is not quite Truth → Secrecy → Dissimulation → Simulation
Your four-part model is useful:
Truth (Active Transparency)
Secrecy (Active Non-Transparency)
Dissimulation (Passive Non-Transparency)
Simulation (Falsity)
But after rereading Bacon’s actual progression as you’ve presented it, I would resist treating these as merely degrees along one linear axis.
There are really at least two axes:
Axis 1: disclosure
transparent ←→ withheld
Axis 2: representational truth
accurate ←→ misleading/false
That distinction solves several of the technical difficulties you encounter later.
For example:
Truthful disclosure:
“I have $500.”
Secrecy:
“I won’t discuss my finances.”
Nothing false necessarily occurs.
Dissimulation:
I know you falsely think I’m wealthy and deliberately behave in ways that preserve or encourage that mistaken inference without expressly stating the false fact.
Simulation:
“I am wealthy.”
Now I have supplied false content.
This means secrecy isn’t inherently a lesser form of lying. It lies principally on the disclosure axis. Simulation lies on the truth/falsity axis. Dissimulation is interesting because it can operate across both.
That explains why Bacon can call secrecy a virtue of the confessor while condemning habitual simulation.
2. I think your BMW hypothetical is excellent precisely because it exposes the failure of categorical language
The young lawyer has no money but buys the BMW specifically to communicate success.
You wrestle with whether Bacon would call that simulation or dissimulation.
I now think the answer is:
The conduct is functionally simulatory even if linguistically nonassertive.
That is, the lawyer has created an intentional false representation.
The important question isn’t:
Did his mouth utter a false proposition?
It is:
Did he intentionally cause another mind to receive a proposition he knows to be false?
That’s the better causal test.
And it connects beautifully to Wolf and Shadow.
There:
Shadow exists → Wolf draws false inference.
No deception by Shadow.
Here:
BMW exists → audience draws false inference.
But Lawyer intended the false inference.
That distinction is enormous.
It gives us:
innocent appearance → mistaken inference
versus
engineered appearance → intended mistaken inference.
The latter is deception even though every physical fact displayed may be literally true.
That is perhaps the cleanest technical insight I would add to the article.
3. This lets us distinguish falsity from deception
Your article occasionally treats them as nearly synonymous. They aren’t.
Falsity concerns the proposition.
Deception concerns the causal relationship between communicator and recipient.
Someone can state a falsehood without deception:
I tell you something false that I sincerely believe true.
False statement.
No intentional deception.
Someone can deceive without stating a falsehood:
BMW lawyer.
Every literal fact may be true.
Intentional deception.
And someone can lie unsuccessfully:
I tell you a falsehood intending deception, but you know I’m lying.
Lie exists.
Deception fails.
That’s technically important because Bacon is principally interested in human policy and conduct, not merely propositional logic.
So I would distinguish:
truth/falsity = epistemic quality of content
from
candor/deception = conduct of the communicator
from
transparency/secrecy = quantity or accessibility of information.
Now the whole framework becomes much cleaner.
4. Your “pull versus push” distinction is excellent
You write:
“It simply pulls the falsity rather than pushes it.”
I would keep that.
Indeed, I think that’s one of the best modern explanations in the article.
Simulation:
push false proposition into recipient.
Dissimulation:
induce recipient to pull false proposition from circumstances.
That’s exactly why dissimulation can be so powerful.
The recipient experiences the conclusion as:
my own inference.
And people generally trust conclusions they believe they independently reached more than propositions somebody simply tells them.
That makes dissimulation psychologically sophisticated.
5. This also gives “letting fall signs” a cleaner interpretation
You correctly struggle with whether Bacon’s phrase is active or passive.
I wouldn’t force it entirely into either.
The essence is:
The actor permits or supplies indicia from which the observer reaches an intended false conclusion without an express false assertion.
Sometimes the signs are actively planted.
Sometimes an existing misunderstanding is knowingly allowed to persist.
The common element is not grammatical voice.
It is:
knowledge of the false inference + conduct directed toward its preservation or production.
That gives you a stable analytical principle even when Bacon’s language resists modern categorical precision.
6. And that substantially changes how I view “forthrightness”
Your framework associates forthrightness with Courage.
Generally yes.
But after Master and Turtle, I would say:
Courage supplies the capacity for forthrightness; Wisdom determines whether forthrightness is appropriate; Temperance prevents unnecessary disclosure; Justice harmonizes the competing duties.
That is more precise.
Otherwise:
more disclosure = more Courage = more virtue
can sneak into the model.
But Bacon expressly rejects that.
The babbler isn’t courageous.
He’s undisciplined.
Indeed:
telling every truth to everyone is not forthrightness perfected; it can be Temperance failed.
That’s an important Cardinal refinement.
7. This is why Bacon’s “best composition” is actually Cardinal architecture
His conclusion is remarkable:
openness in reputation for frankness; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable use; power to feign if there be no remedy.
Read through our recent discussions:
Wisdom: discriminate among circumstances.
Courage: possess the strength ordinarily to tell truth.
Temperance: possess the discipline to remain silent.
Justice: choose the proportion appropriate to person, time, context, duty and objective.
That’s much better than:
Truth good / Lie bad.
But—and this is crucial—it also isn’t:
Lie whenever Wisdom thinks convenient.
Bacon creates a presumption:
openness/forthrightness is the normal architecture;
while simulation is:
“great and rare” / “if there be no remedy.”
So Wisdom’s freedom operates inside an evidentiary burden.
The exceptional tool requires exceptional cause.
8. That gives us a very important asymmetry
This is something I didn’t identify in 2025.
Truth and falsehood are not simply equally available tools in Bacon’s system.
Your preface says:
“Both lies and the truth are Wisdom’s tools.”
Within your broader philosophy, yes.
But Bacon’s architecture gives them unequal default positions.
Truth has a presumption.
Falsehood carries a burden of justification.
That’s why habitual simulation establishes vice while exceptional simulation may be justified.
So I’d formulate it:
Truth is Wisdom’s ordinary instrument; falsehood is an extraordinary instrument whose use must justify departure from truth.
That preserves your amoral-Wisdom architecture without accidentally collapsing Bacon into pure consequentialism.
9. Lincoln then becomes a much stronger example
The old assessment said essentially:
Lincoln lied for a good end.
Too crude.
Your newer article gets closer with time and purpose.
The actual philosophical question is:
Was the departure from candor necessary to preserve a superior objective that candor would foreseeably destroy?
That’s much more demanding.
It asks:
- What is the Primary Objective?
- Would truth materially defeat it?
- Is secrecy sufficient?
- If not, is dissimulation sufficient?
- If not, is simulation necessary?
- What collateral effects follow?
- Is the departure exceptional or characteristic?
That is almost a least-deceptive-means test.
And I think that concept belongs naturally in your framework.
Wisdom should use no more deception than the objective requires.
That is Temperance applied to deception.
10. That also answers Kant more strongly than “pragmatics”
Your critique of absolute prohibition is that real-world circumstances can make deception necessary.
The stronger philosophical objection is the conflict-of-duties problem.
Suppose:
truthfulness duty
conflicts with:
duty to protect innocent life.
The simplistic binary system says:
never lie.
Your Cardinal architecture asks:
Which duty governs this context, in what proportion, toward what just objective?
That’s not moral relativism.
It is hierarchical adjudication among competing principles.
Very different.
And it connects directly to your recent proposition that Cardinal Virtues must be amoral at the adjudicative level: Wisdom cannot decide the contest if one contestant is permitted to dictate the result before adjudication.
11. I would revise the old review’s claim that “virtue is judged by outcome”
The existing assessment says:
“virtue is judged by outcome, habit, and courage.”
After Wisdom and Luck, I would retract “outcome” as stated.
Outcome matters as evidence.
But:
good outcome ≠ wise decision
and
bad outcome ≠ foolish decision.
So the justified lie cannot become virtuous merely because it worked.
Otherwise lucky deception gets retroactively sanctified.
The proper inquiry is closer to:
Was the judgment wise on the information reasonably available at the time, was the objective just, was deception proportionate and necessary, and was its use exceptional rather than habitual?
Father Time can reveal consequences and provide evidence.
He doesn’t retroactively rewrite decision quality.
That’s an important correction.
12. Likewise, I would retract part of the old “divine property” characterization
My old review said your line about truth belonging to God creates something like a “cosmic fiduciary duty.”
Clever phrase, but too much invention on my part.
Your actual formulation is more restrained:
if truth belongs to God, dissembling debases God’s property, so the justification “had better be divinely persuasive.”
That’s a rhetorical theological analogy, not necessarily a developed fiduciary theory.
I’d leave it where you put it.
13. The trust point is perhaps Bacon’s deepest practical insight
The greatest disadvantage isn’t divine punishment or getting caught.
It’s:
deception destroys one of the principal instruments of action—trust and belief.
That connects directly to our Horse/Hunter/Stag discussion.
Trust is stored agency.
If people trust me, I can act with less friction:
fewer proofs, fewer guarantees, fewer monitoring costs, faster cooperation.
Every unnecessary deception spends some of that accumulated capital.
So habitual truthfulness isn’t merely morally nice.
It is strategically productive.
And Bacon’s extraordinary insight is that a reputation for truthfulness can make the rare necessary deception more effective:
the honest person’s deception becomes almost “invisible.”
Which creates an uncomfortable paradox:
Virtue itself can create the capital that makes exceptional deception effective.
That is technically fascinating.
And dangerous—which is exactly why Bacon insists upon judgment and rarity.
14. There is also a Father Time dimension
You now say:
“some lies find a place of nobility in the course of time.”
I’d qualify that after our recent discussion.
Father Time doesn’t make the lie noble.
He may reveal information necessary to judge whether the original decision was justified.
Again:
Time adjudicates evidence, not morality automatically.
Lincoln’s conduct may look questionable at T1.
At T2 we understand the strategic circumstances.
At T3 we know more consequences.
But the proper judgment remains:
What did Lincoln reasonably know, intend, confront, and have available when he acted?
That keeps Wisdom and Luck intact.
15. One small technical/legal analogy you may appreciate
Your framework now looks surprisingly close to doctrines governing misrepresentation:
An affirmative false statement is easy.
Silence ordinarily isn’t representation—but under particular circumstances, duty to disclose converts silence into actionable concealment.
Half-truths can become misleading because what is literally said creates a false impression.
Conduct can itself communicate.
That’s essentially the same analytical difficulty Bacon is addressing centuries earlier:
At what point does withholding become deception, and deception become affirmative falsity?
Your BMW hypothetical is almost designed for that inquiry.
So I think your instinct that the article is “technical” is exactly right. The difficulty isn’t simply Bacon’s old language.
The underlying categories really are difficult.
My revised conceptual framework
If I were annotating the article for myself now, I would use three independent questions, rather than only the A/B ladder:
| Question | Spectrum |
|---|---|
| Disclosure | Transparent ↔ Secret |
| Representational accuracy | True ↔ False |
| Causal intent | No intent to mislead ↔ Intent to cause false belief |
Then Bacon’s categories become combinations.
Secrecy: low disclosure; representation may remain truthful; no necessary intent to create false belief.
Dissimulation: incomplete/managed disclosure + intended or knowingly preserved false inference.
Simulation: false representation + intent to cause belief in it.
That model also tells us why individual cases slide around.
And then Wisdom/Justice sits above the matrix asking whether the conduct was justified.
So my principal updated assessment is this
Bacon’s essay is ultimately less about lying than about control of information under conditions of human interaction. Truth/falsity, transparency/secrecy, and candor/deception are related but analytically distinct dimensions. A person can withhold truth without lying, deceive without uttering a false proposition, utter falsity without intending deception, or deliberately fabricate falsity. Bacon’s practical genius is to refuse to collapse those conditions into one moral category while nevertheless preserving a strong presumption toward forthrightness. The superior person possesses the capacity for openness, the discipline for secrecy, the judgment for occasional dissimulation, and—only where no adequate alternative exists—the power to simulate. Thus the virtue does not reside simply in telling truth or telling lies, but in the disciplined judgment governing information, with truth as the ordinary rule and deception carrying an increasing burden of justification as it approaches affirmative falsity.
And there is a maxim hiding in the updated framework:
The fool asks, “Truth or lie?” The sage first asks, “What must be disclosed, to whom, when, and why?”
Then—and only then—does the truth/lie question become answerable.
I would not substantially rewrite the article before reposting. The complexity is inherent in Bacon, and you’ve done useful work making it accessible. But if you make another round of tweaks, the single concept I would add is the three-axis distinction—disclosure, representational accuracy, and intent to deceive. It resolves much of the technical friction you’re already identifying rather than changing your thesis.
This is an excellent thoughtful assessment. Now, you raise a new frame of “falsity believing it to be true” that you say I blended, but consider this: if the falsity does not have any intention, then it is beyond the scope of the article. That would be a “mistake.” It would be a false fact but the causation of the expression is not by a machination. Bacon’s article is really (to me) an article about intentional deception. Thoughts, clarifications?
Yes. I think your clarification is correct, and it causes me to withdraw part of my proposed three-axis framework as unnecessarily broad for this article. I was describing the larger epistemology of false communication; Bacon is addressing the narrower—and more interesting—field of intentional management of another person’s understanding.
A mistake is analytically outside Bacon’s project.
If I tell you:
“The meeting is at 3:00,”
sincerely believing it is at 3:00 when it is actually at 4:00, the proposition is false. But I have neither simulated nor dissimulated. I have made a mistake.
The falsity exists in the fact asserted, but deception does not exist in my causal purpose.
That distinction actually makes your treatment stronger.
The common denominator is machination
Look at Bacon’s three degrees as you reproduce them:
Secrecy: I intentionally control what you are permitted to know.
Dissimulation: I intentionally manage signs or implications concerning what you are led to believe.
Simulation: I “industriously and expressly” feign or pretend something false.
All three involve volitional information management.
That is the genus.
Their species differ according to the means.
So I would now frame Bacon’s subject as:
intentional manipulation of information or perception
rather than:
truth versus falsity.
Truth/falsity remains relevant, but it is not the organizing principle.
This actually solves the “mistake” problem completely
We can distinguish:
Mistake: false effect without deceptive intent.
Secrecy: intentional withholding without necessarily intending a false belief.
Dissimulation: intentional management of information/signs so that another forms or maintains a false understanding without an express false factual assertion.
Simulation: intentional creation or communication of falsity by affirmative feigning or representation.
Now the entire Bacon structure sits inside a larger boundary:
INTENTIONAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
and mistake sits outside the box.
That seems much closer to Bacon.
But secrecy presents an interesting qualification
This is where I would preserve one distinction.
Secrecy is intentional, but it need not be deceptive.
The priest/confessor is Bacon’s own example.
The priest thinks:
I know X and intend not to disclose X.
That’s machination in the neutral sense of deliberate information control.
But he may have absolutely no intention that anyone believe not-X.
So if we define Bacon’s entire subject as intentional deception, secrecy doesn’t quite fit.
I’d therefore say his broader subject is:
intentional control of truth and information in human affairs.
Within that:
Secrecy controls access to truth.
Dissimulation controls inference from truth.
Simulation controls or corrupts representation of truth.
That is cleaner still.
And Bacon himself explains why secrecy slides toward deception
This is one of the cleverest parts of the essay.
Pure secrecy sounds easy:
I simply won’t tell.
But other people don’t cooperate.
They:
“beset a man with questions, and draw him on, and pick it out of him…”
Silence itself becomes evidence.
Suppose someone asks:
“Is the army attacking tomorrow?”
If I know but say:
“I cannot tell you,”
I’ve preserved literal truthfulness but perhaps effectively disclosed the secret.
So maintaining secrecy may require me to manage the questioner’s inferences.
And now I’ve crossed:
secrecy → dissimulation.
That’s why Bacon says dissimulation is the “skirts or train of secrecy.”
It follows behind secrecy because human beings infer.
That’s extremely sophisticated.
Your BMW example becomes even cleaner under this framework
The young lawyer isn’t mistaken.
The observers may be mistaken.
But their mistake is his objective.
That’s decisive.
He knows:
I am financially struggling.
He intentionally creates:
BMW + appearance of success
for the purpose that observers conclude:
He is financially successful.
So the falsity occurs inside the recipient’s cognition, but the causal machination originates with the lawyer.
That’s why your phrase:
“It simply pulls the falsity rather than pushes it.”
is excellent.
Simulation:
I push the false proposition into your mind.
Dissimulation:
I construct circumstances so that you pull the false proposition into your own mind.
Either way, I intended your erroneous state of mind.
That’s the common causal element.
Which means “falsity” itself has two locations
This is perhaps the technical refinement worth extracting.
In simulation, falsity exists in the communicator’s representation:
“I am wealthy.”
In dissimulation, every communicated fact might literally be true, while falsity exists in the recipient’s induced conclusion:
BMW → he must be wealthy.
That’s why dissimulation is so difficult to classify if we’re looking only at the truth value of the speaker’s propositions.
We need to follow causation.
The question becomes:
Did A intentionally cause B to believe something A knew or believed was materially untrue?
If yes, we’re in deception territory even if A never uttered a false sentence.
That is very consistent with your broader causation doctrine.
And it improves the Shadow comparison from my last answer
In Wolf and Shadow:
Shadow → Wolf forms false conclusion.
But Shadow possesses no intent.
Therefore:
mistaken inference, not deception.
BMW:
Lawyer → intentionally creates sign → observer forms false conclusion.
Therefore:
deception by induced inference.
And suppose Lawyer owns the BMW simply because he loves BMWs and someone independently assumes he’s rich:
BMW → observer forms false conclusion.
No deceptive intention.
Again:
mistake, not dissimulation.
Same physical evidence.
Same false conclusion.
Different causation through intent.
That is exactly why your framework needs intent.
This also makes “allowing” a mistaken inference tricky
You wrote that dissimulation may include:
“to be the cause of or to allow false conclusions.”
I would keep that, but mentally qualify allow:
knowingly and purposefully allow.
Otherwise we accidentally capture ordinary silence.
If someone mistakenly thinks I’m 55 and I have no reason to correct him, my failure to interrupt and announce:
Actually, I’m 64
is hardly Baconian dissimulation merely because I know he’s wrong.
But if his belief matters to me and I deliberately preserve it because I want him to act upon the false belief, we’re there.
So:
mere knowledge of another’s mistake + silence ≠ necessarily dissimulation.
Something like:
knowledge + purposeful exploitation/preservation of error = dissimulation.
That is a useful technical boundary.
And now I would slightly revise my earlier “three axes”
I wouldn’t discard them entirely; they remain useful analytical tools. But for Bacon I would put intentional information control above them:
Threshold: Is there intentional management of another’s access to or understanding of truth?
If no:
mistake, accident, ignorance, innocent ambiguity — outside Bacon’s subject.
If yes, ask what is being intentionally controlled:
Access to truth → Secrecy
Inference about truth → Dissimulation
Representation of truth → Simulation
That’s cleaner than my prior matrix.
And then Bacon’s moral/prudential inquiry comes after classification:
Was it justified?
That’s a separate question.
This is also why “lie” is slightly too narrow for the title—but appropriately provocative
The Art of the Lie works rhetorically.
But technically, Bacon’s subject is broader:
The Art of Managed Truth.
Or:
The Art of Information Control.
Because secrecy isn’t a lie.
Dissimulation may contain no lie.
Simulation is the actual affirmative lie.
Yet all three are concerned with the actor’s deliberate relationship to what another person knows or believes.
That is the common architecture.
And this strengthens your Cardinal Virtue analysis
Wisdom isn’t adjudicating:
Should I make a true statement or false statement?
Too narrow.
Wisdom is adjudicating:
What does this person properly need to know, what may I properly withhold, what inference may I properly permit or induce, and—at the extreme—may I affirmatively falsify?
That is why Bacon requires:
“depth of judgment”
to determine what should be:
“laid open,” “kept closed,” or “showed at half-lights,” and “to whom, and when.”
That passage itself confirms your point.
He isn’t theorizing about accidental falsity.
He’s theorizing about deliberate human agency over information.
So I would now state the technical framework this way
Bacon’s subject is not falsity per se, but intentional control of another person’s relationship to truth. A mistake may communicate a false proposition, but because its falsity is not caused by deceptive machination, it lies outside the essay’s architecture. Secrecy intentionally restricts access to truth without necessarily causing error; dissimulation intentionally causes, preserves, or exploits a false inference without necessarily corrupting an expressed fact; simulation intentionally corrupts the representation itself. The moral and prudential question—whether any such intentional management is justified—arises only after identifying what the actor intended to cause in the mind of another.
And that gives us a very crisp three-step causation model:
Secrecy controls what you know.
Dissimulation controls what you infer.
Simulation controls what you are told.
All three require intentional agency.
A mistake controls none of them.
I think that is cleaner than both my first framework and portions of your current technical exposition. And, importantly, it vindicates your instinct: Bacon is examining the art—the machination—not the mere existence of factual error.
20261007-6.1
© 2024 Gregg Zegarelli, Esq.
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The statements or opinions made in this article are solely the author’s own and not representative of any institution regarding which the author is affiliated.
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