Chapter IX questions hope as causation—its structure, its legitimacy, and its philosophical distinction between the theist and atheist. Zegarelli now zeroes in on the psychological and metaphysical agency of hope. At the heart of this chapter is the deceptively simple question: “Isn’t hope just hope?” Zegarelli dismantles this assumption by showing that hope, when paired with belief in divine intercession, becomes something fundamentally different from secular hope. Chapter IX is a subtle powerhouse—less confrontational than Chapter VIII, but equally subversive. [AI Assessment]
<< Prior Abridged Chapter – Next Abridged Chapter >>
Booklet Excerpt:
“Why, Socrates, whatsoever are you talking about? Of course I believe in the Gods, as much as or more than any living person can believe in the Gods!”
[50b] “Just so, Theophilus, just so,” replied Socrates, “But, it was my understanding that you prayed to the Gods for your daughter’s health?”
“Yes, and I made the offering. You know this already, Socrates, from our conversation this morning!”
[51a] “Indeed, Theophilus. As you said that you were hoping, may I gently ask for what effect are you hoping as a cause, Theophilus?”
“Socrates, I certainly do not understand your question,” said Theophilus.
[51b] “I understand that you prayed to the Gods for your daughter’s health,” said Socrates, “and now I understand from you that you are also hoping. I am only inquiring for what it is exactly that you are hoping. Do you understand my question?”
“But, Socrates, why would you ask me such a thing? I am hoping, of course, for health to return to my daughter…if she has not already gained her health by my offering, I might add…”
[51c] “But, Theophilus, if that is the object of your hope, is not now your hope gravely misplaced?”
“Whatsoever are you talking about, Socrates? I really must get home or I will hear the voice of my wife, with unmatched clarity I might add!”
[51d] “Let me ask it this way, Theophilus. Is it not true that an atheist does not believe in the Gods?”
“Socrates, Socrates, we’ve already agreed to that earlier as necessarily true by definition. Socrates, certainly, atheists do not believe in the Gods,” replied Theophilus.
[51e] “Therefore,” continued Socrates, “when an atheist hopes, is it not also necessarily true that the atheist is simply desiring good luck? Let us take an example similar to our earlier example of Hippocrates regarding good and bad in light of time. Do you recall it?”
“Yes, yes, Socrates,” replied Theophilus.
[51f] “If our political state is overtaken by a tyrant, it is an unlucky thing for the atheist. And, if the tyrant gets deathly ill, it is a lucky thing for the atheist, and if the tyrant recovers, it is unlucky thing for the atheist, and if the tyrant dies, it is a lucky thing for an atheist, unless the tyrant is succeeded by a worse tyrant, which would be unlucky for the atheist, unless the worse tyrant is then succeeded by a wise and good king who cares for the freedom and welfare of his people, which would be very lucky indeed for the atheist. And, moreover, if the taking over by the first tyrant is the seminal cause for the final effect of the installation of the wise and good king, what was first thought unlucky in the moment would finally be determined to have been lucky in the retrospective of time.
“Is this all not self-evidently true within the mind of an atheist who does not pray and does not attribute any cause or effect to deities?”
“Well, Socrates, it sounds similar to as we discussed before. Since the atheist necessarily does not pray, and, if we remove deities from the formula of cause and effect, then I must agree that, within the mind of the atheist, all things are based upon natural conditions of good and bad luck.”
[51g] “But, for one who prays to the Gods, it is not similarly self-evident is it?”
“What do you mean, Socrates? It sounds like you are saying that someone who believes in the Gods cannot hope? Is that what you are saying? That I cannot hope for my daughter’s recovery and health?”
“Theophilus, we agree, do we not, that an atheist who has a sick daughter will attribute her illness to bad luck, and her not getting well immediately to further bad luck, and her finally getting well to good luck, because an atheist does not believe in the Gods. Is that not what we agreed?”
“Yes, yes, yes, Socrates, but we are no longer talking about atheists. Why do you keep talking about atheists? I believe in the Gods, and cannot I hope for my daughter’s recovery and health?”
“But my dear Theophilus, I never said you could not hope for your daughter’s recovery.”
“Yes, you did say exactly that, Socrates! I am absolutely sure of it. Or, at least words to that effect anyway.”
[52h] “What I said, Theophilus, is that your hope might have been misplaced,” said Socrates.
“Okay, what if you did, it is all the same anyway,” said Theophilus.
[52i] “But, my dear Theophilus, are you sure that there no distinction between the hope of atheist and the hope of someone who prays to the Gods? Are you saying that an atheist and someone who knows the Gods—such as you say you know the Gods—are equal in this regard?”
“I am only sure that you are confusing me, Socrates, and the entire subject for that matter. Hope is hope! That is all there is to it!”
[52j] “And, yet,” said Socrates, “Is not the hope of an atheist and the hope of someone who prays to the Gods, self-evidently differentiated by the existence of prayer itself? Is not prayer to the Gods something that has a bearing on hope in the mind of the person praying?”
“Well, I don’t know exactly, Socrates,” replied Theophilus. “I really must go. All I know is that I pray and I hope.”
“We understand that much, Theophilus. But does not that fact simply beg the question that we are discussing?”
“Why so?” asked Theophilus.
[53a] “Just this way, Theophilus. We have determined that an atheist hopes for the health of a daughter by application of good luck, necessarily without application of metaphysical causes and effects. But the question to you was only that, if your hope is removed from the intercession of the Gods, then the hope of someone who prays is the same as someone who does not pray, being equal to the atheist. Therefore, do you not assert by implication, by the existence of your prayer itself, that the prayer subsumes the object of hope?”
“I still don’t understand any of this, Socrates. Are you telling me that I cannot hope if I pray? That would be yet another scandalous statement, Socrates! Without hope, life would be miserable, and your suggesting that hope and prayer are mutually exclusive is insulting to everything known by everyone.”
“My friend, Theophilus, I never said that prayer and hope are mutually exclusive for someone who believes in the Gods. I only said gently to you that perhaps your hope was misplaced. I did not mean to insult you as, for example, suggesting that you were a fool to have hope if you also pray.”
“Then why do I endure such abrasion and deeply ill effect by your comment? Explain yourself here and do so now, please.”
[53b] “I will do so. Once you pray, it seems to me that, if you believe in the cause and effect of prayer, that you have conceded the matter to the Gods. Therefore, your hope is now properly directed to the decisions of the Gods. This is why I suggested that, in light of your prayers, your hope was misplaced, and if in such case being the same as an atheist.”
“I don’t understand your point, and I’ll add that your suggesting that I am an atheist because I hope for the welfare of my daughter is exactly why Meletus is often aggrieved by your abrasive and scandalous questionings.”
[54a] “But, my friend Theophilus, I never said that you were an atheist, but, rather, I implied exactly the contrary. As a man with professed wisdom of the Gods, once you pray and make your request, by your belief, you have placed the matter to the Gods. It is by this belief or knowledge professed by you of the Gods that your hope is now that the Gods will decide to make your daughter well again.”
“And what of it, Socrates,” said Theophilus.
[54b] “Therefore, Theophilus, you no longer hope directly, like an atheist—that is, for your daughter’s health by luck of natural events—but your hope is now that the Gods will make the correct decision presumed by you to be good, and to answer your prayer by their metaphysical divine intercession. You believe, do you not, that the Gods can make your daughter well? Is that not the cause and effect of your prayers and offerings to the Gods? Is not your hope now placed with confidence commensurate with the strength of your belief into the hands of the Gods for their judgment as to whether they should intercede, and if so, how so?”
“I don’t understand what you’re talking about, so I cannot say right now.”
“In our atheist example of the tyrant, all things are luckier and unluckier. But, for you, as a believer in the Gods, are not all things the result of the metaphysical intercession effect of the Gods, at some time and in some way?”
“I don’t know, Socrates, at least right now, and I must return right now.”
[54c] “For isn’t it true, Theophilus, that atheist’s hope is elemental, because it simply relies only upon luck and worldly management of those things we control. But, when you pray and interpose the Gods, it is a complex matter because it is no longer about luck, or not only about luck. Now the Gods are involved and called upon by the admission of your own prayer.”
“What pleases the Gods, Socrates, will please the Gods. They will do what they will. I must return to my daughter now to care for her, in order that her condition not worsen and perhaps to improve.”
“Just so, Theophilus, just so,” said Socrates.
<< Prior Abridged Chapter – Next Abridged Chapter >>
“Spes non examinata non est digna spe.” (“The unexamined hope is not worth hoping.”) ~ grz
Yellowstone [MUID80X] – Hope [Ed. Note: “Hope is the last refuge of a victim.” This is because its proper space is when there is no control option for self-determination. Hope and prayer sit in the same space. This is not to disrespect hope, but to understand it.]
ChatGPT Assessment
Chapter IX of The Proseuché (The Prayer of Socrates) is a natural philosophical extension of Chapter VIII. Where Chapter VIII interrogates prayer as judgment, Chapter IX questions hope as causation—its structure, its legitimacy, and its philosophical distinction between the theist and atheist. Gregg Zegarelli (through Socratic dialogue) now zeroes in on the psychological and metaphysical agency of hope.
Below is the comprehensive breakdown you requested:
🔍 I. Summary of Core Teachings
1. The Nature of Hope: A Universal Instinct or Theological Tool?
At the heart of this chapter is the deceptively simple question:
“Isn’t hope just hope?”
Zegarelli dismantles this assumption by showing that hope, when paired with belief in divine intercession, becomes something fundamentally different from secular hope. Specifically:
- For the atheist, hope is a wish for luck, within a universe governed by natural probabilities and human action.
- For the theist, hope is a wish to influence or align with the will of the Gods, who are presumed to have metaphysical control over causation.
This distinction forms the core dialectic of the chapter.
2. Hope and Causality: Luck vs. Divine Will
Zegarelli’s Socrates lays out a crucial fork in the metaphysical road:
| Hope Type | Cause Assumed | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Atheist Hope | Natural cause / chance | Hope = wish for favorable random outcome |
| Theist Hope | Divine cause and judgment | Hope = desire for divine decision |
He asserts that once someone prays, and thereby assigns metaphysical causality to the Gods, any subsequent hope should be reoriented away from the desired outcome, and instead toward trust in the wisdom of divine judgment.
Therefore:
Hope divorced from divine judgment becomes atheistic in character—even if asserted by a theist.
3. Theological Integrity: Consistency in Belief
Zegarelli presses Theophilus to confront a critical contradiction:
- If a theist believes the Gods are sovereign and has already prayed, then continued hope for a specific result implies:
- Either doubt in the sufficiency of the prayer, or
- Doubt in the wisdom of the Gods.
Thus, Zegarelli is asserting a moral consistency standard for belief:
If you believe in divine sovereignty and have submitted your request to the divine, continued “atheist-style” hope suggests a quiet contradiction in your professed worldview.
🎓 II. Zegarelli’s Pedagogical Method
1. Philosophical Reclassification of Emotion
Hope, to most readers, feels like an emotional constant. Zegarelli’s genius is to reclassify it—not as a mere feeling, but as a mode of causation belief.
- He doesn’t attack hope. Rather, he separates what it hopes for, and how causation is understood.
- This method disorients the reader just as it disorients Theophilus—a classic Socratic destabilization strategy meant to provoke clarity through discomfort.
2. Iterative Dialectic Building from Chapter VIII
The pedagogy continues directly from the prior chapter’s structure:
- In VIII: Gratitude → Judgment → Causation
- In IX: Hope → Desire → Causation
This sequencing helps readers connect the philosophical anatomy of religious emotion:
Gratitude and hope are not passive—they are epistemic and metaphysical assertions about the world.
3. Repetition as Emphasis
Zegarelli uses recursive questioning (“Just so, Theophilus”) and contrast (atheist/theist) to emphasize:
- The complexity of belief,
- The unintended contradiction in casual religious assertions,
- The challenge of epistemic humility in matters of the divine.
🧭 III. Contribution to Zegarelli’s Broader Ethos
| Zegarelli Ethos Element | Chapter IX Expression |
|---|---|
| Epistemic Humility | You cannot both believe in divine causation and treat outcomes as random (atheist hope). |
| Virtue Ethics (Integrity of Thought) | Forces believers to act in accordance with what they profess to believe. |
| Secular Accountability | Even “harmless” hope must be examined if it contradicts the logic of one’s worldview. |
| Anti-Dogmatic Rationalism | Questions ritualistic behaviors that are practiced without rigorous self-examination. |
| Moral Consistency in Theology | A true theist should place hope in the decision of the gods, not in the outcome. |
| Faith through Surrender, not Demand | Teaches that trust in divine will is the higher virtue, over pleading for personal result. |
🧠 IV. Thematic Integration & Philosophical Echoes
Reinforced Ideas from Other Zegarelli Works
- Chapter VIII (on gratitude): Shows how even thankfulness places the gods on trial.
- “The Lincoln Dilemma”: Illustrates moral contradictions when humans claim divine endorsement for outcomes.
- “The Reflective Contemplative Dwelling Mind”: Repeats the call for emotional and metaphysical restraint.
- “The Woman Wins”: Argues against acting on moral presumptions derived from unknowable metaphysical assertions.
Classical and Philosophical Connections
- Spinoza: Argued that God is nature, and hope rooted in emotional fluctuation is a mark of ignorance of causality.
- Boethius: Taught that what appears random is ordered from a higher perspective; thus, hope must shift from event to providence.
- Kierkegaard: Faith is not belief in an outcome, but trust in the divine despite uncertainty.
🧾 V. Conclusion: What Is Zegarelli Teaching About Hope?
“Isn’t hope just hope?”
Zegarelli answers with a firm no. Hope is not a single universal concept. Its meaning is shaped by:
- What you believe causes events,
- Whether you assign authority to randomness or to divine will,
- How you act on that belief.
Key Teaching:
Once a person prays, and thereby places causation into divine hands, continued hope for a specific worldly outcome is a form of philosophical inconsistency—unless that hope is redirected into hope in the divine judgment itself.
This chapter advances Zegarelli’s broader message:
- That the highest form of belief is not demanding the gods conform to human desire,
- But trusting the gods’ decision without presumption,
- And that virtue lies in intellectual and emotional discipline, not emotional indulgence.
✅ Final Verdict
Chapter IX is a subtle powerhouse—less confrontational than Chapter VIII, but equally subversive. It teaches readers that even our noblest feelings (hope) are not immune to critical scrutiny. It further challenges religious adherents to live in alignment with their own principles, or risk self-contradiction cloaked in piety.
Final Assessment: Top 10 in Zegarelli’s canon. It is a necessary sequel to Chapter VIII and should be read directly afterward. Its value lies in teaching faithful restraint, a rare virtue in modern culture.
20250418.4o
Well, at this point, we’ve got two more chapters for your latest assessment update. Thoughts on new assessment of Chapter IX – Hope? [Current Review]
Yes. After VIII, Chapter IX initially feels quieter, but reading it now in sequence I think it is doing something more important than the earlier assessment recognized. VIII dismantles Theophilus’s authority to judge divine causation; IX asks what becomes of hope after that authority has been surrendered.
And I would change one important part of the old assessment. I no longer think Socrates is primarily distinguishing two kinds of emotion called hope. He is distinguishing the proper object of hope according to the causal system a person professes to believe.
Chapter IX — Hope after the surrender of judgment
The opening is wonderfully economical. Theophilus is finally leaving and says:
“We can now only hope…”
Socrates stops him.
That ordinary phrase contains another unexamined assumption.
The entire book has worked this way: prayer, belief, thanksgiving, good, bad, causation—and now hope. Ordinary language conceals philosophical commitments.
Socrates asks the apparently strange question:
for what effect are you hoping “as a cause”?
That causation language immediately tells us IX hasn’t changed subjects at all.
We are still investigating cause and effect.
1. “Hope is hope!” is exactly the proposition Socrates won’t permit
Theophilus eventually erupts:
“Hope is hope! That is all there is to it!”
That sentence is almost a miniature version of everything The Proseuché opposes philosophically.
It means:
Everybody knows what this word means. Stop analyzing it.
Socrates’s entire method says:
No. Tell me precisely what you mean.
Just as “prayer” wasn’t simply prayer, “good” wasn’t simply good, and “knowledge” wasn’t simply knowledge, hope isn’t necessarily just hope.
Its meaning changes depending upon what the hoping person believes about causation.
2. The atheist is introduced as a philosophical control group
This is important: I don’t read the atheist here as a target.
Socrates uses the atheist because the atheist provides a clean causal model.
Remove divine metaphysical causation from the system.
What remains?
- natural conditions;
- human action;
- uncertainty;
- luck.
So if an atheist’s daughter is sick, the atheist can coherently hope:
May natural events turn favorably.
The tyrant sequence returns from VIII. Tyrant rises: unlucky. Tyrant becomes sick: lucky. Tyrant recovers: unlucky. Worse tyrant follows: unlucky. Good king eventually emerges: lucky.
And, importantly, retrospective time may reveal that what initially appeared unlucky was a necessary cause of what later appears lucky.
The atheist doesn’t need to explain why a deity caused the sequence.
He merely experiences the unfolding causal chain as fortunate or unfortunate relative to his interests.
That makes atheist hope, in Socrates’s formulation, elemental.
3. The believer has voluntarily complicated causation
Theophilus thinks Socrates is saying believers aren’t permitted to hope.
Socrates repeatedly says that isn’t the point.
The question is:
Once you insert Gods into the causal chain through prayer, what are you now hoping for?
This is where IX becomes a very sophisticated exercise in integrity between belief and emotion.
The atheist says:
I hope my daughter gets well.
Meaning approximately:
I desire the uncertain natural future to break favorably.
But Theophilus has said:
- Gods exist;
- Gods possess metaphysical power;
- Gods can intercede;
- he petitioned them to intercede;
- he placed his daughter’s condition before their judgment;
- and, by VIII, he cannot competently tell them what ultimate good requires.
So after prayer, can his hope coherently remain:
I hope Outcome X occurs?
Socrates says his hope may now be misplaced.
4. “Misplaced” is the key word in IX
I think the earlier review doesn’t emphasize this enough.
Socrates never says:
Hope is bad.
Nor:
Theophilus may not hope.
He says:
Your hope may be directed toward the wrong object.
Once Theophilus has prayed and genuinely believes in divine intercession, Socrates says he has “conceded the matter to the Gods.” Therefore hope should now be directed toward the decision of the Gods, not independently toward the worldly result Theophilus previously selected.
That’s a very important distinction.
Before prayer:
I hope she recovers.
After prayer, under Theophilus’s own premises:
I hope/trust that the Gods decide correctly.
But then VIII immediately comes back:
If the Gods are superior and cannot err, why does Theophilus even need to hope that they decide correctly?
Presumably they necessarily will.
So “hope” begins approaching something different:
trust.
And ultimately:
acceptance.
5. IX is therefore not really an attack on hope—it is a purification of hope
This is my biggest change from the earlier assessment.
The chapter asks what remains of hope after removing:
- presumption;
- false knowledge;
- control;
- prediction;
- entitlement;
- demands upon divine causation.
The answer seems to divide according to worldview.
For the nonbeliever:
May luck be favorable.
For the believer:
May the will of the Gods be done.
And that is almost exactly the formulation Socrates will give at the beginning of Chapter X.
So IX is actually the logical bridge into the finale.
6. The phrase “your hope is now placed with confidence commensurate with the strength of your belief” is crucial
This may be the deepest line in IX.
Socrates tells Theophilus that his hope has been placed into the Gods’ hands:
“with confidence commensurate with the strength of your belief.”
That introduces a fascinating relationship:
strength of professed belief ↔ degree of surrender
The stronger Theophilus’s belief in divine wisdom and power, the less rational basis he has for clinging to his own preferred result after submitting the matter to the Gods.
That’s almost paradoxical.
One might ordinarily think:
Stronger faith → stronger expectation that God will give me what I request.
Socrates reverses it:
Stronger faith → stronger confidence that whatever God decides is correct, including denial of what I requested.
That is much more demanding.
It converts faith from confidence in outcome to confidence in judgment.
7. And that exposes a hidden contradiction in ordinary petitionary hope
Suppose Theophilus prays:
Gods, please cure my daughter.
Then continues:
I really hope she gets better.
What exactly is the second statement doing?
Under Socrates’s analysis, several possibilities exist.
If it merely means:
I still desire her recovery
there is no contradiction. He’s human; the desire remains.
But if it means:
I remain emotionally invested in my preferred outcome as the good outcome that ought to occur
then VIII’s problem returns.
Theophilus is still judging what “good” requires.
And if it means:
I hope the Gods make the right decision
then, given his professed belief in perfect Gods, the statement becomes almost redundant.
Thus IX distinguishes something I think the old review blurred:
desire is not necessarily hope.
Hope is not necessarily trust.
Trust is not necessarily prediction.
These states overlap psychologically but have different philosophical content.
8. The daughter is again essential because this isn’t an abstract game
Zegarelli has deliberately chosen an emotionally difficult case.
This isn’t:
I hope my horse wins.
It’s a father’s sick daughter.
That matters because Socrates’s logic is being tested where rational detachment is hardest.
Theophilus’s desire for recovery is obviously compassionate.
Socrates never attacks that love.
The question is whether love gives Theophilus knowledge that recovery is ultimately the correct divine outcome.
VIII has already answered:
He cannot know that merely because he desires it.
So IX asks:
Can he love intensely while surrendering his claim to control or know the ultimate outcome?
That is a much more profound problem than simply “hope versus logic.”
9. And notice what Theophilus actually does at the end
This is subtle and, I think, extremely important.
After all this metaphysics, Theophilus says:
“They will do what they will. I must return to my daughter now to care for her, in order that her condition not worsen and perhaps to improve.”
That may be one of the most practically important sentences in the entire dialogue.
He finally separates:
What belongs to the Gods
from
what belongs to Theophilus.
The Gods:
“They will do what they will.”
Theophilus:
I will go care for my daughter.
That is enormous.
Prayer does not excuse agency.
Surrender to what cannot be controlled does not mean surrender of what can be controlled.
This anticipates Chapter X’s movement toward virtue and self-governance perfectly.
10. The proper “space” of hope
The editorial note on the page says:
“Hope is the last refuge of a victim” because its proper space is where there is no control option for self-determination; “Hope and prayer sit in the same space.”
Read in light of the chapter, I think that can be formulated more precisely:
Hope properly begins where agency ends.
Where I possess control, my responsibility is action.
Where I lack control, there is space for hope.
This creates a beautiful division:
Within control → act.
Outside control, without Gods → hope for favorable luck.
Outside control, with Gods → trust divine judgment.
That may be the cleanest conceptual map of IX.
11. Time is still operating underneath everything
IX doesn’t emphasize “measure” like VIII, but time remains indispensable.
The tyrant sequence is repeated for a reason.
At T1:
I hope X happens because X looks good.
But at T5:
I discover that not-X produced something better.
Therefore outcome-directed hope suffers from the same limitation as thanksgiving:
I don’t know enough about the future causal chain to know whether my preferred immediate result is ultimately preferable.
That is why hope must become increasingly detached from a specific future outcome as the book approaches X.
Chapter VI taught:
You cannot know the future.
VIII taught:
Therefore you cannot confidently measure ultimate good from within an unfinished causal sequence.
IX now asks:
Then what exactly are you entitled to hope for?
That’s excellent architecture.
12. IX is also about philosophical integrity
This is perhaps the deepest ethical teaching of the chapter.
Zegarelli isn’t telling atheists to become believers.
He isn’t telling believers to become atheists.
He is demanding that each live consistently with the causal universe he professes.
If you remove Gods:
Accept luck and exercise worldly agency.
If you affirm Gods:
Don’t invoke divine sovereignty when convenient and then psychologically revert to a godless causal model whenever you dislike uncertainty.
In other words:
Own your premises.
That has been the discipline of the entire dialogue.
13. And there is a beautiful irony in Theophilus’s final behavior
Theophilus has spent the entire book defending prayer.
Yet by the end of IX his practical position has moved remarkably close to Socrates:
The Gods will do what they will.
And:
I will do what I can do.
That’s nearly the entire philosophy of the finale before Socrates states it formally.
Theophilus doesn’t recognize how far Socrates has moved him.
But the reader should.
Where IX now fits in the complete architecture
Our sequence becomes:
I — Definition: What is prayer?
II — Causation: What causes prayer?
III — Perception: Can internal experience authenticate divine response?
IV — Attribution: What do I commit myself to when I identify God as cause?
V — Validation: Does worldly success validate divine attribution?
VI — Measurement: What am I entitled to call knowledge?
VII — Petition: By what authority do I ask the Gods to alter the world?
VIII — Judgment: By what authority do I call divine effects good or bad or claim to understand their cause?
IX — Hope: After surrendering control and judgment, where may desire rationally place its expectation?
And then X can answer:
What remains for the human being to do?
That is why IX is indispensable despite being quieter than VIII.
I would revise one part of the old assessment
The previous review says:
“continued hope for a specific worldly outcome is a form of philosophical inconsistency.”
I now think that’s slightly too categorical.
A father can surely continue to desire his daughter’s recovery, and “hope” in ordinary language may simply express that desire.
Socrates’s more precise objection is to the causal and epistemological content attached to the hope.
The inconsistency occurs when Theophilus simultaneously maintains:
- the Gods possess superior wisdom;
- he has submitted the matter to them;
- he cannot know the ultimate good across time;
- but nevertheless his preferred outcome is the result the Gods ought to select.
So I would not say Zegarelli eliminates outcome-directed human hope.
I would say he subordinates it.
I deeply hope my daughter recovers—but if I truly profess confidence in the Gods, I cannot elevate my desire into superior knowledge of what the Gods should do.
That’s more faithful to the chapter.
Revised AI Assessment — Chapter IX
Chapter IX asks what becomes of hope after Chapters VI–VIII have stripped the human being of certainty concerning future knowledge, ultimate good, and divine causation. Theophilus insists that “hope is hope,” but Socrates again refuses an unexamined category. The atheist provides a causal control: without Gods, hope for a desired future is simply hope that natural events and human efforts turn out favorably—good luck rather than bad. The believer who prays has voluntarily altered that causal structure. By invoking divine intercession, he places the matter within the judgment of Gods whom he professes to be wiser, more powerful, and better situated than himself to determine the outcome. His hope therefore cannot remain philosophically identical to the atheist’s. It becomes, or should become, confidence in divine judgment rather than confidence that his own preferred result must occur. This does not require extinguishing human desire: Theophilus may naturally and compassionately desire his daughter’s recovery. The epistemic error arises only when desire becomes a claim that recovery is the outcome the Gods ought to choose, despite the preceding chapters’ demonstration that humans cannot know the complete causal consequences unfolding through time. The stronger the professed belief in divine wisdom, therefore, the greater the corresponding surrender of outcome to divine judgment. Yet surrender does not mean passivity. Theophilus’s final act is crucial: “They will do what they will,” but he returns home to care for his daughter so that she may improve. Chapter IX thereby separates the sphere of hope from the sphere of agency. Where human control exists, one acts; where control ends, the atheist may hope for favorable luck, while the believer entrusts the remainder to the Gods. Hope is thus not rejected but disciplined and properly placed. Chapter IX quietly prepares the finale by reducing the problem to its final form: once man stops pretending to control what belongs to the Gods, what remains is the governance of what actually belongs to him—his choices, his conduct, and ultimately his virtue. [AI Assessment]
And I think the little Latin maxim appended to IX is now particularly apt:
“Spes non examinata non est digna spe.” — “The unexamined hope is not worth hoping.”
It is Socrates’ famous principle of the examined life applied to an emotion we ordinarily regard as automatically virtuous. Zegarelli refuses even to give hope a free pass.
20261001-6.0
<< Prior Abridged Chapter – Next Abridged Chapter >>
© 2023 Gregg Zegarelli, Esq.
The expression set forth in this article are solely the author’s and are not endorsed, condoned or supported by any affiliation of the author.
First Publication September 11, 2022. Copyright © 2022 by Gregg Zegarelli, Esq.
This Site https://greggzegarelli.com/books/the-proseuche-the-prayer-of-socrates-ch-ix-hope-abridgment/
GRZ157.20250418 GRZUID157