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[31f] “But, my dear Theophilus,” said Socrates, “the question is not whether a few certain prayers are answered by the Gods, but whether many more prayers are refused or ignored by the Gods. Such as it is, is it not true that, for each person who achieves that glory by prayers, there are countless others who did not achieve glory by their prayers? Does not all we discussed prove that most prayers are ignored or refused by the Gods as the general rule, notwithstanding the exceptional triumph, grand and glorious though it is? Did not such a triumph by warfare as you assert result in the unanswered prayers of countless widows and mothers whose husbands and sons perished? But let me ask this: Is it not true that there are persons who do not pray, or who do not pray in some accepted form, and still receive gifts from the Gods, and other persons who do pray accordingly yet do not receive gifts from the Gods?”
“I cannot—I will not—say that, Socrates,” said Theophilus, “as I do not know or will not admit it. To do so would be in a manner to condemn our Gods or to judge them, which I will not do. The Gods do what they will. If the Gods desire to give gifts to people who do not pray or not to give gifts to people who pray, I don’t know how the Gods figure all that out. I cannot judge the Gods. Who am I to judge the Gods?”
VIII.
[32a] “Just so, Theophilus, just so. But regarding the past conduct of the Gods, is it not true that you do judge the conduct of the Gods all of the time?”
“That is a ridiculous assertion, Socrates! I never judge the Gods, Socrates, never!”
[32b] “Nor should anyone, Theophilus. But, then again, is there not also another type of prayer; that is, prayer that, rather than regarding the metaphysical intercession of the Gods regarding the future, is there also not prayer that regards the past?”
“I don’t understand, Socrates, please explain yourself, and do it most clearly,” replied Theophilus.
[32c] “Simply this: prayer to give thanks to the Gods for what has occurred in the past, and, in doing so, giving credit to the Gods for what they have done?”
“Oh, yes, Socrates, thank you! I did not know where you were going with that question, and I am pleased to hear you say so. We are righteous to be thankful to the Gods!”
[32d] “And, therefore, you agree that, to the extent that your thanks is by a fact of causation of the Gods, that it is a fact that the Gods have done the very thing for which they are being thanked?”
“Yes, it must necessarily be so. We thank the Gods for all the good things they have done!”
“So, Theophilus, are there not two judgments implied by your thanks to the Gods?”
“What are talking about, Socrates? How so, Socrates, how so?” questioned Theophilus.
[32e] “The first is that the condition or effect regarding which you pray to the Gods in thanks is something good, which is the first judgment. The second is that the Gods caused the condition, which is the second judgment. Isn’t this thanks to put the Gods on trial for a past occurrence, in the same manner as trying an accused criminal?”
“By Zeus, Socrates, by Zeus! This is some form of delusion! I cannot believe such words from you saying that a prayer of thanks is to put the Gods on trial! Never has such a calumny been made against the Gods, and all of us who serve the Gods, and all who thank the Gods! This is such a twisting and contortion of truth that it is scandalous and contrary to everything we Athenians know about the Gods!”
“But, my friend Theophilus, I am only asking you a question, if you will answer me. Is it not true that when an event occurs—any event—that either the Gods caused that event, or the Gods permitted that event to occur? And is this fact not implicated by prayers and offerings and sacrifices to the Gods for divine metaphysical intercession for the future, which implicates the very thanks to the Gods for having done exactly that in the past? You have served the Gods for many years and attested that you know all that can be known by men, so how is my question misplaced to you of all people, Theophilus?”
“I’m not sure, Socrates, and right now I am a bit worked up by your words and I am having some difficultly thinking,” exclaimed Theophilus.
[32f] “And, in the same manner of thanks to the Gods for when you have judged their intercessions to be good, do you not similarly condemn the Gods for their intercessions that you have judged to be bad?”
“By Zeus, by Zeus! By Zeus, Socrates! Never, ever, ever, do our prayers condemn or curse the Gods! When we judge that the Gods have done good things, then we thank the Gods, and when we judge that the Gods do bad things, then we simply admit that we do not understand them.”
[32g] “But does not adjudication of one necessarily adjudicate the other by implication. And, indeed, these bad things that the Gods do or allow to be done that you have judged not to qualify as good things—in that moment of time during your prayer at least—it is for these bad things that you seek the Gods to intercede and change their godly minds?”
“Socrates, Socrates, Socrates! I cannot say what the Gods will do or have done, or that they would be changing their godly minds! I have said as much before! Please give me a moment, I need a moment to regain myself. I will need to get…”
[32h] “But now I am confused, Theophilus! Does not the act of praying presuppose by some form of judgment to know exactly what the Gods do, what the Gods are capable of doing in the future, what the Gods have done in the past, and whether what the Gods have done or will do as good or bad, in the same result of judging an accused criminal? Indeed, Theophilus, whenever there is prayer in thanks, have not the persons praying thereby implied exactly what the Gods have done or given to them?”
“We thank the Gods for all the good things, Socrates! We thank the Gods for the good things they do through our humility and appreciation, and we would be prideful to condemn the Gods for the bad things!”
[33a] “But are you not begging the question, Theophilus? For does not a judgment of good or bad—which are not necessarily perfect inverses of each other but an inseparable continuum of context by any measure—necessarily precede whether or not to be thankful? For example, if our political state is overtaken by a tyrant, it would be judged a bad thing. And, if the tyrant gets deathly ill, it would be judged a good thing. And if the tyrant recovers, it would then be judged a bad thing. And if the tyrant dies, it would be judged a good thing, unless the tyrant is then immediately succeeded in time by a worse tyrant, which would then be judged in reversion to a bad thing, unless the worse tyrant is then succeeded by a good king, which would then be judged in reversion back to a good thing, and so on, back and forth, step by step. And, moreover, if the taking over by the first tyrant is the necessary seminal cause for the effect of the installation of the good king, what was thought to be a bad thing in that first moment would then be reverted to have been a good thing after all, with application of time that displaces judgment of what is good or bad in the moment. Let me ask you this, Theophilus, have you ever eaten a meal and given thanks to the Gods for the food before eating it?”
“Of course, Socrates, of course! Everyone does so, and my family and I do so very often. We thank the Gods for the food they provide to us!”
[33b] “And, is it not also true, Theophilus, that the very same food for which thanks had been given to the Gods is occasionally in such condition to cause the most excruciating of stomach ailments, with retching, and heaving, and convulsions? That is, the same food that you thanked the Gods for providing is the same food in a poisoned condition that causes anguish, so much so that some people even say they welcomed death rather than to endure the sweatings and gaggings?”
“So, what of it, Socrates?”
[33c] “Is it not implied that what was judged by you to be good for you at the time of your prayer of thanks was actually bad for you at the time of your prayer—unbeknownst to you—and that time itself disclosed the unknown truth, which caused you then to make another prayer now in the category of a request, such as we have already discussed? That is, first, a prayer in the form of a request for intercession of the Gods to provide food. Then, second, followed by a prayer to the Gods in the form of thanks for the food the Gods provided in fulfilling the request for intercession in providing the food. Then third, the food being poisoned by the Gods thereby necessitating a prayer by you in the form of another request to heal the condition of bodily retching of the poisoned food?”
“Why are you saying all of this, Socrates. I don’t understand your point, Socrates!”
[33d] “And, then again, might it not be that, if the person praying to the Gods in thanks for the food before eating it—judging it to be a good gift from the Gods—and then becoming ill by that same food from the Gods, and then praying to the Gods with a request to be healed from what is later judged to be bad food, might be upon a person such as our Hippocrates, who, by becoming badly ill, is thereby given personal cause to discover a good method of cure for the ailment benefitting all Athenians? Is this not like our earlier example of the ruling by a tyrant, who being at first judged as a bad thing, was the first necessary cause for the effect of the installation of a good king? That is, where something judged bad in one moment of time is later judged to be good in a different moment of time, or similarly in reverse? Could it not be that what was judged good food by the Gods, then judged bad food by the Gods, was actually a gift of goodness by the Gods by placing the ailment upon Hippocrates as a cause for him to find a cure for the misery?”
“Why, certainly, that is exactly it, Socrates! You have said it true and well! Thank you, Socrates! My goodness, I feel so much better now, as your words were deeply distressing me almost to the point of some illness myself. Yes, of course, the Gods would have given us that poisoned food as a cause for Hippocrates to find the cure from it!”
[33e] “Might not the Gods then have simply skipped a step, Theophilus?”
“Whatsoever do you mean now, Socrates? What?” asked Theophilus.
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First Publication September 11, 2022. Copyright © 2022 by Gregg Zegarelli, Esq. Gregg can be contacted through LinkedIn.
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