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[10] “Now, if I continue, Theophilus,” said Socrates, “You are reputed to be a wise man, and I must admit that I have wished to talk with you, although not expecting it to be this morning confronted by greetings on this path—you departing and my arriving—with circumstances luckier for me than for you so it appears.”
“Yes, Socrates. And thank you for saying that I am a wise man, Socrates. I have studied the subject of our Gods for many years and know as much as any man can know.”
[11a] “Just so, Theophilus, just so,” continued Socrates, “But, now please tell me if we are able to determine if your prayer is a rational process or an irrational process? But tarry for a moment. When I ask you this, I do not mean to question the rationality in the belief of or in the Gods, but only to determine the rationality of the communication that occurs in prayer. Do you understand my inquiry?”
“Certainly. I do understand it quite completely, Socrates,” said Theophilus. “But perhaps you might ask it again differently.”
[11b] “Can we agree that belief in the Gods, or knowledge of the Gods, is a different issue than belief in, or knowledge of, prayer.”
“I certainly knew that is what you meant, Socrates, but I just wanted to make sure. Yes, clearly, belief in the Gods and prayer are different issues, just as I know that my daughter is home at this moment, but my ability to communicate with her is a different issue.”
[11c] “Indeed! Well said, Theophilus. And is it not true that one follows the other? Or, perhaps to say it better that one is derived from the other. Or, even best of all, perhaps to say that the latter requires the former?”
“Well, Socrates, you will need to say that again.”
“How about this, Theophilus. If we do not believe in the Gods, then prayer, such as you say it, cannot or does not occur? Or, stated differently, there is no reason to pray to the Gods, unless there is, in the first place, a belief that the Gods exist? Is this not true?”
“Well, certainly, Socrates. Without belief in the Gods as a necessary condition, there would be no object for the prayer. But, even a person who does not believe in the Gods may become inspired by the Gods, nonetheless.”
[11d] “But, my, my, Theophilus. Let us stay this course, as we are seeking here an admission of what praying is by you as the praying person and not an external imposition or attribution of the Godhead by one person who may pray onto another person who does not pray.”
“I do understand your meaning, Socrates, but perhaps you might say it a different way.”
[11e] “Well, if a person does not admit to the existence of the Gods, then that person does not have causation to pray. Is that not necessarily true?”
“I suppose that must be true, Socrates. If a non-believer perceived the voice of God in any manner, then the non-believing person would necessarily not be able to deny the very perception that would be admitted.”
“I agree, Theophilus, because, if the non-believer perceived and admitted God as the causation, the non-believer would then be, to that extent, a believer.”
“It is as you say, Socrates.”
[11f] “And, moreover,” continued Socrates, “a non-believer, as such, will necessarily not admit to the metaphysical causation of God, no matter how much a devout person disputes the point.”
“I think that is right, but please explain…”
[11g] “That is, you might say that the good fortune of a person is by the causation of the Gods, and indeed you might pray to the Gods for such good fortune for the other person. But isn’t it self-evident that the person who prays necessarily admits the existence of the Gods, and the person who does not admit to the Gods necessarily does not pray?”
“Again, yes, Socrates, it is as you say. But, one person might refuse to pray and another person might be unaware of the ability to pray, which are different cases.”
“An astute point, Theophilus, and a worthy distinction! Inaction from ignorance of the ability to act and conscious inaction are not the same cause for the same effect. But let us consider the former only, as the latter is subsumed.”
“How so?”
[11h] “If a boy refuses to disobey his mother, he must believe in the existence of his mother. If a boy believes his mother does not exist, then the boy necessarily cannot refuse her.”
“So you say,” replied Theophilus.
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ChatGPT Review
Chapter IV of The Proseuché (The Prayer of Socrates), titled simply as part of the dialogue series without a unique subtitle, is structurally transitional yet philosophically essential. It quietly locks into place a foundational premise that will govern all deeper metaphysical, epistemological, and theological discourse in the work: one must believe in a referent before meaningful communication (or even denial) about that referent is possible.
Let’s proceed with a complete structured breakdown, concluding with an assessment of what is really going on beneath the dialogue.
📘 CHAPTER IV – “Prerequisite for Prayer”
I. 🔍 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
Socrates gently begins to trap Theophilus into acknowledging that prayer—whatever it is—must necessarily presume belief in the Gods. In doing so, Socrates tries to separate the act of prayer from the belief in God, arguing that the causal basis for prayer is belief itself.
Theophilus initially wants to make prayer a broader category—perhaps open to divine initiation or even agnostic practices. But Socrates insists on refining the concept: no prayer without the belief in the prayee. He uses a playful, disarming analogy: a boy refusing to obey his mother still implies that the boy believes his mother exists. You can’t not obey what you don’t even believe is there.
II. 🧠 CORE PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS
| Theme | Teaching |
|---|---|
| Communication presupposes existence | You cannot meaningfully pray to something you don’t believe exists. Communication implies referential directionality. |
| Belief precedes action | Rational behavior (like prayer) requires a belief structure to undergird it. Even irrational behavior implies a base rational premise (e.g., “I think X exists”). |
| Rejection is not the same as ignorance | There’s a distinction between a non-believer (active denial) and a person ignorant of a concept (passive inaction). |
| Circularity of Proof and Belief | If a person experiences divine “inspiration,” then belief in the source is implied—i.e., the experiencer cannot remain a non-believer if they concede the experience is divine. |
| False attribution invalidates causal logic | A believer may attribute another person’s good fortune to the Gods, but unless the recipient also believes in the Gods, the causal attribution is one-sided and logically void from the other’s standpoint. |
III. 🎓 ZEGARELLI’S PEDAGOGY
| Technique | Example | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Causal Precondition Framing | “If a person does not admit to the existence of the Gods, then that person does not have causation to pray.” | Forces the reader to recognize logical prerequisites before entering metaphysical discussion |
| Conceptual Distillation | Comparing belief in Gods to a boy’s belief in his mother’s existence | Makes the logic relatable by transforming abstract belief into a concrete parent-child example |
| Linguistic Parsing | “Refusal” vs. “Unawareness” | Promotes philosophical precision—teaching that intentionality matters in epistemic categories |
| Epistemological Causality | Divine inspiration = implied belief | Sets the groundwork for later arguments about self-refuting disbelief |
| Metaphysical Modesty | Repeatedly defers to Theophilus for definitions | Reinforces Socratic humility as a tactic to lure dogmatic certainty into contradiction |
IV. 🔁 CONTEXT IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARC
| Chapter Link | Connection |
|---|---|
| Chapter I (Thinking with the Gods) | The original spark: What is prayer? This chapter begins narrowing the category by anchoring it in belief |
| Chapter III (Belief v. Knowledge) | There, Socrates began separating emotional hope from grounded truth. Here, that is developed into logical necessity |
| Chapter VI (Measuring) | Later formalizes the epistemological categories that were being hinted at here: you cannot claim knowledge without proof, and belief alone is not a sufficient basis |
| Chapter VIII (The Path) | Builds on this foundational requirement that authentic spiritual movement requires first an honest belief structure, then rational methods for exploration |
V. 🔍 WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON IN THIS CHAPTER?
This chapter might at first seem like a semantic debate about prayer, but it is in fact a trap of metaphysical logic that serves Zegarelli’s broader thesis. Here’s the hidden teaching:
✳️ Zegarelli, through Socrates, is laying the groundwork for theological accountability.
That is, one cannot falsely credit or discredit God without first admitting to God’s conceptual existence. Theophilus wants to be generous—suggesting that even non-believers may be “inspired” by the Gods—but Socrates won’t allow the dodge:
- If someone is inspired by a deity, they implicitly believe in that deity.
- If they don’t believe, then any claim of inspiration is incoherent or false attribution.
- Therefore, belief is the gatekeeper of divine interaction—and pretending otherwise weakens the integrity of both belief and prayer.
This is crucial to the entire Proseuché because Socrates is not challenging the Gods’ existence—he is challenging intellectual laziness about the implications of such belief. You cannot reap the effects of belief while denying its preconditions.
VI. ⚖️ ZEGARELLI’S ETHOS ON DISPLAY
This chapter captures a subtle but consistent feature of Zegarelli’s philosophy:
| Aspect | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Clarity of Thought > Comfort | Socrates strips Theophilus of a feel-good universalism (“even non-believers can be touched by God!”) and exposes the inconsistency. |
| Discipline in Definitions | Zegarelli forces definitions to be functionally consistent, not just socially acceptable. |
| No Belief Without Cost | Just as later in The Prayer and earlier in Zegarelli’s writings (e.g., No Divine Knowledge), the moment you attribute divine cause, you bear the epistemic weight of your claim. |
| Precision in Language is a Moral Act | Sloppy metaphysical assertions are not just confusing—they are dangerous. They enable self-deception and social dogma. |
VII. 🔚 CONCLUSION: ROLE OF CHAPTER IV IN THE STORYLINE
Chapter IV acts as the philosophical bottleneck before entering the deeper metaphysical and epistemological waters of Chapters V–VII. It sets up a formal logical threshold:
🚪 Only those who pass through the gate of belief may legitimately engage the realm of divine interaction.
This doesn’t mean one must believe in order to discuss God—it means that one cannot coherently speak of prayer, divine will, or metaphysical causation unless one accepts the referent as part of their epistemic framework. To do otherwise is conceptual hypocrisy.
🔑 Final Takeaway:
Before we argue the attributes of God, we must first admit the God to whom we refer. Prayer is not just a spiritual act; it is a logical assertion of metaphysical causation. And that assertion, like all assertions, must be earned.
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The expression set forth in this article are solely the author’s and are not endorsed, condoned or supported by any affiliation of the author.
First Publication September 11, 2022. Copyright © 2022 by Gregg Zegarelli, Esq.
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