The Proseuché (The Prayer of Socrates) Ch. VI [Measuring] Abridgment

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[13] “As you are considered to be a treasured servant of the Gods, I am sure you can help me with this question, Theophilus.”

“Yes, indeed.  Thank you, Socrates, for saying that I am a treasured servant of the Gods.  I have served the Gods for many years.  What is your question?”

[14a] “Ah, yes, let me see…  I asked you if prayer is a rational process or an irrational process?”

“You say that I am wise, Socrates” responded Theophilus, “but I cannot answer the question by the precise dichotomy of choice you stated.  Now, just to be clear, we are talking about prayer to the Gods only, and not belief in the Gods themselves?”

“Yes,” said Socrates.  “We are only talking about the communication by prayer itself.”

“Well, then, to the extent that a human being is the conscious causal initiator of prayer, I think the cause of prayer is, in that regard, rational.  But any divine inspiration that might be causation for prayer or that is perceived as a response from the Gods, would, I think, be better categorized as irrational.”

[14b] “And to define our terms more clearly, in the former case of prayer caused by a rational process, is it because there are times that you actually consciously choose to initiate prayer to the Gods?”

“Yes, I think that is so,” replied Theophilus.

[14c] “And, in the latter case, you say irrational for divine inspiration because the causation was from the Gods regarding whom you cannot perceive a discrete voice or sound, as such, as you stated before?”

“I say this,” replied Theophilus, “because I do not think that hearing the Gods or inspiration from the Gods can be said to be rational in the manner that you indicated, such as the discrete voice of our wives that we know so well, although it is perhaps quite emotional or intuitive; being more feeling than thoughtful.”

[15a] “That is more than a fair reply to my inquiry, Theophilus.  Now, to move forward, is belief in the Gods rational or irrational?” 

“Oh, Socrates, that question is not fair!”

“Why do you say so, Theophilus?”

“Because you have provided a question which includes its own answer; therefore, it is not a proper question.”

[16a] “Theophilus, perhaps you have found me out!” said Socrates.  “But please tell me my trick, if I really have done so.”

“You asked about my ‘belief’ which implies something less than knowledge.”

[16b] “But,” said Socrates, “I did not ask you what you know, but only what you believe.  Are you saying that to believe in something is inherently irrational? Cannot you believe in something, and yet still be rational?”

“How so?” asked Theophilus.

[16c] “Well, as you said earlier,” said Socrates, “a person might know a fact to be a fact.  Or, a person might have a belief or an opinion, known to be just that—something less than and not a fact.  Are not both of these rational, in the sense that to know a fact to be a fact, and to know an opinion or belief to be exactly that and not a fact, are rational and correct states of thinking?”

“Yes, Socrates, and indeed I said as much already when you asked me about our slaves.”

[16d] “Indeed, Theophilus,” replied Socrates.  “And, did you not say that it would be a state of delusion, and an incorrect state of thinking, for a person to have an opinion or belief treated the same as a fact, or to hold a falsity as a factual truth.  Did I misunderstand you?”

“No, Socrates,” replied Theophilus, “you did not misunderstand me at all.  It seems to me that a fact is a fact, and belief makes something no more or less a fact.  And belief or an opinion in something understood not to be a fact, does not create a fact in the subject contemplated.  But, to consider something that is not a fact to be a fact, would certainly be irrational, as would be to hold that an opinion or belief is a fact, when it is not.”

[16e] “Splendid.  Moreover, as you said regarding our slaves, it is true isn’t it, Theophilus, that to think a fact is not a fact, or to think an opinion or belief is a fact, would be a kind of delusion.”

“Well, Socrates, that might be true.  Yes, of course, to think a fact is not a fact is delusion.  But, to clarify what I said, to be more specific, an opinion or belief might be correct after all and therefore it is the same as knowledge of a fact.”

[16f] “But,” said Socrates, “shouldn’t we remember an important distinction: being the fact itself as distinguished from the state of mind regarding that fact.  Do we agree that what is, is what is, and what is not, is not, but what is in our minds regarding what is or is not is something separate from what is or is not? Therefore, we should address them as such and not conflate them?”

“Certainly, Socrates,” said Theophilus, “I will agree with your statement as I understand it.  Everyone knows that it is true that the existence of a thing suggested is or is not as a matter of fact, but our state of mind regarding that condition is something different.”

[16g] “And you said to think a fact is not a fact is delusion.  Is this in a manner that, if we take the count of our soldiers and then deny the count that we just took on the basis that we took it is a form of delusion? Or, if we should state that water runs uphill by its nature, that it also is a form of delusion?”

“Yes, Socrates, those are fair examples of facts that to deny them as they are would be delusion.”

[16h] “Why is that so, Theophilus? Why are these things facts that to deny them would be delusion?”

“Because,” replied Theophilus, “the matter is easily tested and proved with the debate thereby settled.  We can observe first-hand the soldiers that I count, adding or deducting soldiers, and I can pour water from a cup to prove it runs downhill and not uphill.”

[17a] “I agree.  And, as to the latter, do we agree that opinion and knowledge are not the same thing?”

“As you say it, Socrates, I cannot agree.”

“But why not, Theophilus?” 

“Well, Socrates, let’s take my daughter for example.  If I am away from my home, as I am now, and I believe that my daughter is at home, and if my daughter is actually at home, then my belief is the same as knowledge.”

“Theophilus, now you are again trying to trick me again!”

“What do you mean by that statement, Socrates?”

[17b] “We were discussing the difference between knowledge and opinion.”

“Yes?”

[17c] “And now, Theophilus, you’re using the term ‘belief’ rather than term ‘opinion.’”

“Well, I don’t think I did, but, even if I did, I think that they are the same thing.”

[18a] “Then perhaps it is required that we should compare them.  Isn’t it true that belief and opinion share only some, but not all, of their attributes, such that every opinion also a belief, but not every belief is an opinion?”

“I understand exactly what you are saying, Socrates, but please explain.”

[18b] “Let us step back to your comparison regarding the location of your daughter.  Do you recall what you said?”

“Of course,” said Theophilus, “I just said it.  If I am away from my home and I believe that my daughter is at home, and if my daughter is actually at home, then my belief is the same as knowledge.”

“But, Theophilus, have you not conflated your state of mind with the fact, as we just said we would not do, and skipped a step in the course of your thought?”

“What do you mean?” asked Theophilus.

“Time, Theophilus, time.  That is, the space of time from the point when you believed it, until the point when you knew it.”

“I don’t understand, Socrates.”

[18c] “Well, Theophilus, until you returned home, what was the state of your mind that was the attribute of belief, that, when you went home to discover the actual whereabouts of your daughter, no longer existed in your mind? Before you went home, you did not know that your daughter was at home.  Isn’t that true?”

“Well, I asserted that I knew she was at home, such as now, I know she is at home, and when I go home, I will find her there at my home.”

[18d] “But, that is not knowledge in the present moment, Theophilus, isn’t that just your opinion or belief getting lucky in the future?”

“Socrates, you are confusing the issues.  It is very simple, whether I knew my daughter was at home or I believed my daughter was at home, if she is at home, then my belief is the same as knowledge.”

“So, Theophilus, as we stand here, is your daughter at home?”

“Certainly, she is.  I know it.”

“You made a prayer with an offering at the temple before our meeting, isn’t that true?”

“Yes, that’s what I did, Socrates, as I’ve already told you.”

[18e] “And you believed that your prayer with the offering would cause a positive effect on your daughter’s health by the intercession of the metaphysical power of the Gods, isn’t that true?”

“Certainly,” replied Theophilus.

“So, if your offering was successful, could it not be that, unbeknownst to you right now at this precise moment of time, that your daughter has recovered and is now joyously at the market with thanks to the Gods?”

“Well, yes, I suppose so, if that is really the case.”

“But, if I understand you, your prayer presupposes that it could be so.  Moreover, Theophilus, in saying ‘if that is the case’ have you not just admitted a condition that must be proved as satisfied? And, your belief in the metaphysical power of the Gods as an interceding cause would now support that the condition is now satisfied?”

“That must be true, Socrates.”

[18e] “So, we can conclude that, as you stand here, you believe that your daughter is at home, because your prayers and offering were unsuccessful, or, otherwise, your prayers were successful and your daughter might have recovered and is now at the market?”

“I suppose that it could be so.”

“Therefore, is it not true that, as you stand here now in this precise moment of time, it is not a fact, but only a belief in your mind as to your daughter’s location?”

“That is what I said.”

[18f] “But, until you go home, you cannot be sure.  Accordingly, is not the distinction between your belief before you go home from right now, the attribute of doubt during the period of time ending at your arrival at home? That is, before you go home, you cannot be sure that you are correct that your daughter is at home, and you cannot prove it in this moment.”

“It is not doubt at all, Socrates, because I know my daughter is at home.  It is only that I cannot prove it to you right now.”

[18g] “So it seems, Theophilus,” said Socrates, “that you do not doubt your daughter’s location, but you doubt that the Gods have cured her?”

“Not at all, Socrates, because, even if my daughter is cured, I know that she would not have gone to the market anyway! Therefore, I have no doubt that she is at home.  I simply cannot prove it to you right at this moment.”

[18h] “So be it, Theophilus.  But can we agree that the attribute of a fact is that it can be proved, in the moment, first-hand and without hearsay or doubt, with such clarity of proof that the persons to whom it is presented would be in delusion to have doubt of the fact presented?”

“No, I cannot agree to this, Socrates, as you say it.  If I say to you that the existence of the trees proves the existence of the Gods, we might not agree to the logic as to what ‘proves’ what.”

“Well said, Theophilus! And does that statement not implicate a distinction between a belief and an opinion, if not knowledge of a fact?”

“How so, Socrates?” asked Theophilus.

[18i] “Let us say that instead of meeting here, we met at your front door when you were just leaving your home.  Let us say I asked you then if your daughter was at home.  The difference being that it was only a moment since you exited your home and saw your daughter.  And, if I asked if your daughter was at home, would you answer ‘yes’ or ‘I believe so’?”

“I would answer, ‘yes,’ of course.”

“And yet might it be that your daughter could have seen you leave, thinking you would not re-enter, and exited through the window to see her boyfriend, as some girls of Athens have been known to do? Therefore, in truth, there is a differential between pointing to your daughter as proof she is home and having a belief that she is home by some point of speculation, no matter how minimal.”

“That might be true, but it is highly improbable that I would be wrong, as my daughter does not have a boyfriend! So, again, my belief is the same as knowledge, or at least almost the same.”

[19a] “’Almost’ is not an attribute of knowledge, Theophilus,” replied Socrates.  “Probability or luck, and doubt or inability to prove the fact, are the essential bases shared by belief and opinion, but not knowledge.  Is it not true that a belief and an opinion are only separated from knowledge by any degree of uncertainty, doubt, or inability to provide proof, no matter how minimal? And is it not true that the only differential between a belief and an opinion is that opinions are beliefs that are based upon logical conclusions from stated premises, whereas a belief does not necessarily require logic?”

“I see that point, Socrates, but I am convinced that my belief—or opinion—is correct, even though I have no doubt and I cannot prove it to you.”

[19b] “But, my dear Theophilus, have we not already agreed that even to have no doubt to something that cannot be proven, but to assert it as a fact notwithstanding, is the space of delusion? Is not the space of delusion not only saying that a fact is not a fact, but to say what is properly within the space of an opinion or belief is a fact?”

“As we stand here right now, my daughter is at home.  I do not doubt it.  When I arrive home, I will be able to prove it.”

[19c] “Tell me, Theophilus, can you divine the future?”

“Of course not, Socrates! Only the Gods can know the future.”

[19d] “And, Theophilus, you are not one of our Gods, or are you?”

“Socrates, I wish not to take any offense, but I am certainly not one of our Gods!”

[20a] “Then, my dear Theophilus, how can you implicate time into your presumption of proof that would exist in the future.  Anything that is asserted to occur in the future is, by some application of our definition, not knowledge, and deprecated solely to the space of belief or opinion.  That is, as no one but the Gods would know the future—such as the concept of time is within the consideration of the Gods—and you are not one of the Gods, it impossible for you to know the future and what you might prove or not prove in the future because a proof is no better than the grounds upon which it rests.”

“But I will say again,” said Theophilus, “even as to my tree example, that what it proves to me, being the existence of the Gods, is not what it proves to you, and so we still beg the question,” replied Theophilus.

[20b] “That is a fair statement.  But let us start by taking the example of counting 400 soldiers in the common manner of their unit of existence before a battle,” said Socrates.

“But why do you say this phrase, ‘in the common manner of existence’ or something like that as you said it?”

[21] “Well, Theophilus, can we agree that a soldier is a discrete thing of existence, such that he can walk away from us or become killed, and we can deduct him from our measuring count?”

“Certainly.”

“And is this not something distinct from the situation where we divide something unitary that is flowed together in a continuum by its nature?”

“I don’t understand,” said Theophilus.

For example, is not counting 400 individual soldiers a distinct measure different than, for example, when we might take the measure of the height of a man for making armor, that is, when we divide his unitary existence by our own decided point of separation and count, perhaps as tall at the waist of 3 feet? Any one of those soldiers has an inseparable continuum of unitary existence, each only being alive or dead as such and not separable, but a man may not live and also be divided in half.  When we cut up the man into such divided parts of measure, we do not account for how something unitary and flowing is really properly divided at the tiniest portion even beyond our perception of existence? Thus, the qualification in my statement.  Do you see the distinction?”

“Yes, of course.  I do understand that, if a soldier is killed in battle, we would deduct him from our count.”

[22a] “Now, Theophilus, do you understand the distinction in proof of counting soldiers versus the distinction of proof in the existence of trees proving the existence of the Gods?  Is not proof self-evident in the moment, without conjecture, in the sense that proving you will bleed if I would cut you is different that proving the existence of the Gods? That is, a matter regarding which we have neither doubt nor the inability to prove it?”

“Well, Socrates, I do see your point.”

[22b] “And, regarding proofs,” said Socrates, “cannot we make a distinction between scientific principles and facts of existence.”

“I do understand your meaning generally, Socrates, but can you be more specific?” requested Theophilus.

[22c] “Let us say that we assert 200 + 200 = 400.  This is a principle of mathematics, which is a scientific truth so far as science is known to us.  Isn’t that right?”

“Yes, Socrates, everyone knows that 200 + 200 = 400.”

“And we can, with similar mathematics, create proofs of the math, such as 400 – 200 = 200, giving and taking soldiers from a line to prove the existence of the truth of the principle?”

“Yes, of course, Socrates.”

[22d] “But, whether, in fact, we have four hundred or two hundred soldiers, such as what we have being matched to a number, is a matter of fact rather than formula, correct? In other words, whether we are holding two apples is a matter of fact, but the mathematics of adding two apples to another two applies is a matter of science.”

“Yes, Socrates.  But I don’t understand the relevance.”

“And is it not a scientific fact of the baker that a baker will use principles of fermentation to raise bread, and a wine maker to make wine?”

“Yes, of course,” replied Theophilus.

“And the science of it always works on the same principles, if the same facts are applicable? That is, does not the baker and wine maker need to ‘proof’ the leavening agent to ensure it is usable?”

“It is true, Socrates, that I never heard a baker or wine-maker say that the science changed from day to day, but only that the grain was old, or the temperature of the day too hot or cold or moist or dry.”

“Can we conclude, therefore, that knowledge by proof follows two kinds, one being the principles of existence, and another being the facts of existence?”

“Yes, Socrates.  I understand that a recipe may call for conditions that, if always the same, would produce the same result, but the ingredients used or other conditions are something different than the recipe, and the baker and the wine maker never blame their skill or science of recipe, but, rather, the factual conditions provided by the Gods.”

[22e] “And, Theophilus, which is your proof of Gods by the trees, does it rest upon a formula of known science or does it rest upon the existence of facts.”

“Well, I am not sure, Socrates, and I am not sure it must be one or the other.”

[22f] “Is it because the Gods do not follow the rules of existence, such as we understand existence, that is, in time or space, or science or fact?”

“I cannot say, Socrates, because they are Gods.”

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First Publication September 11, 2022. Copyright © 2022 by Gregg Zegarelli, Esq. Gregg can be contacted through LinkedIn.

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